Chung-Chi YU^[2]

Abstract

My paper elaborates how Husserl changed his viewpoint about psychology prior to the upsurge of phenomenological psychology in the 1920s. Based on the elaboration, we see how Husserl shifted his viewpoint about the relationship between psychology and phenomenology between 1910 and 1920. The slow procedure from antithesis to synthesis is demonstrated through elaborating the articles of “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911) and “Phenomenology and Psychology” (1917). My elaboration will help clarify how Husserl brought up the new discipline of phenomenological psychology in the 1920s.

   

Key words: Husserl; psychological phenomenon; phenomenology.

Resumen

El presente artículo discute cómo Husserl cambia su perspectiva sobre la psicología antes del surgimiento de la psicología fenomenológica en la década de 1920. Basado en esto, vemos cómo Husserl cambia su consideración sobre la relación entre la psicología y fenomenología entre 1910 y 1920. Este lento procedimiento de antítesis a síntesis es demostrado a través del examen de los artículos “La filosofía como ciencia rigurosa” (1911) y “Fenomenología y psicología” (1917). Mi discusión ayudará a aclarar cómo Husserl inauguró la nueva disciplina de la psicología fenomenológica en la década de 1920.

   

Palabras clave: Husserl; fenómeno psicológico; fenomenología.

§ 1. Introduction

We all know that Husserl makes severe criticisms of psychology in his earlier writings. In his Logical Investigations he rejects logical psychologism, whereas in Ideas I he makes a sharp distinction between psychology and phenomenology in order to establish the profile of phenomenology. His judgment about psychology is overall negative in his earlier writings. Psychology is an empirical science that studies the empirical facts of mental states of either individuals or collectives. In contrast, phenomenology is an eidetic science that aims at the study of pure phenomena. Whereas psychology presupposes the existence of the world, phenomenology brackets that existence through reduction.

However, in the 1920s Husserl brings up a kind of psychology that is based on phenomenology, which he calls phenomenological psychology. He elaborates a brand new type of psychology, first, in the second volume of his 1924 lectures on Erste Philosophie (Hua VIII: 132–190, 275–301, 444–450 [275–390, 480–505, 575–582]),^[3] in his 1925 summer lectures on Phenomenological Psychology (Hua IX: 3–234 [1–179]), and later on, in his 1927 article for the Encyclopædia Britanica (Hua IX: 237–301 [83–179]), the 1928 Amsterdam Lectures (1928) (Hua IX: 302–349 [213–253]), and most notably in his 1936 Krisis, the second half of the third part of which is completely dedicated to the elaboration of this new psychology (Hua VI: 194 ff. [191 ff.]). Though a seemingly self-contradictory discipline due to the eidetic research of the mental states of the worldly egos or collectives, Husserl regards such a discipline as parallel to transcendental phenomenology and views it as the universal science that lays ground to the empirical sciences, in particular the socio-human sciences. In view of this, if we speak of applied phenomenology, phenomenological psychology is definitely relevant, so long as it is located between transcendental phenomenology and the empirical sciences. In other words, it works as the bridge between phenomenology and empirical studies.

My aim is to elaborate how Husserl changes his viewpoint about psychology from the earlier writings to the emergence of phenomenological psychology. The main question is: how does he change his evaluation about psychology from negative to positive? For the purpose of elaborating his viewpoints about psychology, the paper will focus on the psychical phenomenon (das Psychische). Two texts by Husserl between 1910 and 1920 are particularly relevant in this regard: “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911) and “Phenomenology and Psychology” (1917), both of them included in Husserliana XXV.

§ 2. Elaboration of the psychical phenomenon in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911)

Husserl brings up an exploration of the psychical phenomenon in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”. He does it by distinguishing psychical phenomena from physical nature. Nature is composed of things with units, that means, everything complex can be divided into small parts that are spatial units. Units coexist in space. But temporal phenomena, such as psychical phenomena, cannot be viewed in the same way, so long as they are continuous and can be hardly divided into smaller units. For Husserl, a psychical phenomenon “knows no real parts, no real changes, and no causality” (Hua XXV: 29 [106]); this sort of description belongs only to natural sciences. Only if we naturalize psychic phenomena could we attribute these predicates. But it would be absurd to do that (Hua XXV: 29 [106]).

Now, what is more remarkable is that natural phenomena display themselves through appearances. Appearance is the appearance of something substantial, be it being, essence, or substance. But this distinction between appearance and essence is not applicable to psychical phenomena, insofar as the latter are characterized as phenomena. Husserl explains the indistinguishable uniqueness of phenomena as follows:

Psychical being, being as “phenomenon,” is in principle not a unity that could be experienced in several separate perceptions as individually identical, not even in perceptions of the same subject. In the psychical sphere there is, in other words, no distinction between appearance and being, and if nature is a being that appears in appearances, still appearances themselves (which the psychologist certainly looks upon as psychical) do not constitute a being which itself appears by means of appearances lying behind it—as every reflection on the perception of any appearance whatever makes evident. It is then clear: there is, properly speaking, only one nature, the one that appears in the appearance of things. Everything that in the broadest sense of psychology we call a psychical phenomenon, when looked at in and for itself, is precisely phenomenon and not nature (Hua XXV: 28–29 [106]).

He says additionally:

What psychical being “is,” experience cannot say in the same sense that it can with regard to the physical. The psychical is simply not experienced as something that appears; it is “vital experience” <Erlebnis> and vital experience seen in reflection; it appears as itself through itself, in an absolute flow, as now and already “fading away,” clearly recognizable as constantly sinking back into a “having been” (Hua XXV: 29–30 [107]).

Husserl asks about what the psychical phenomenon “is.” In this context, he uses the quotation mark, which indicates that to make a definite description of the psychical phenomenon is not as easy as with the physical phenomenon. It is not legitimate at all to treat the psychical phenomenon in the same way as we treat the physical phenomenon or nature. The psychical phenomenon is not experienced as something external to consciousness, it is itself experience (Erlebnis), which has to be intuited through reflection. One cannot catch the present right at the present moment, reflection implies that one has to take a step back.

We also need to point out that the conscious-act cannot be conceived in the mode of a spatial unit, as already indicated above. Conscious-acts are not enclosed in themselves such as a solid billiard ball, nor is the flow of consciousness comparable to a string of billiard balls. The billiard-metaphor is misleading insofar as the flow of consciousness is a continuous flow without distinctions. As the flow carries on, the present becomes past, and the near past sinks deeper to the remote past. The past can certainly be recollected through remembering.

In this context, Husserl emphasizes repetition. That which happened to me in the past can happen to me once again, be it passively or actively. The thing (die Sache) is exactly what can be reconfirmed in different conscious-acts. It is what transcends the factual conscious-acts that happen only once and which are therefore different from each other. Anything that is related to essence has similar characteristics. Due to their specific essential character, psychical phenomena have affinity to pure phenomena, which are open to eidetic study.

By the way, perhaps most importantly, the psychical phenomenon is characterized by intentionality. Intentionality proves that psychical phenomena are not enclosed in themselves, but relate themselves to something beyond. It is commonly held that everyone has their own specific experiences, which are their very own personal and empirical experiences, and therefore that there are no commonly shared contents that can be encountered in the psychical phenomenon. However, Husserl denies this perspective regarding psychical phenomena. Insofar as psychical phenomena are essentially characterized, they have close relation to the eidos, to the Sachen. Husserl holds that the only appropriate way to deal with psychical phenomena is none other than “intentional analyses.” Treating them under the paradigm of natural sciences, which recognizes only objective nature and physical bodies, cannot be but misleading.

Intentional analyses aim at analyzing the flowing phenomena of consciousness. Yet, if we merely focus on the factual aspect of the flow, we adopt an investigation that is based on the psychophysical perspective. Husserl rejects this perspective because we should not only see the factual aspect of consciousness. Psychical phenomena of human beings, though factual, are nevertheless open to the field of “Sachen,” that is, the field of eidos. At any rate, psychical phenomena point to what transcends itself. Certainly, we should never forget that the eidos cannot do without the factual aspects of the psychical flow. It means that eide cannot but display themselves through factual phenomena. Husserl also indicates that only through these two aspects may we appropriately conceptualize what “spirit” or “mind” means. In addition, the human body can be viewed as the necessary condition of the human mind, but it does not mean that we should study the human mind only through the material aspect, or the human body. When we come to deal with the psychical phenomenon of someone else, the role of the body becomes more obvious. So long as we are unable to access directly the mind of other persons, we can only encounter other minds through the medium of their bodies. The case of others’ minds shows how the mind and the body function close together. Somehow, when studying psychical phenomena, we should not only rely on the body or the material aspect alone. Husserl regrets that the psychical phenomenon has been quite often misconceived, in particular on the basis of the naturalistic point of view. We should dispense with such a naturalistic point of view and conceive the psychical phenomenon only as it is. Husserl explains:

The spell of the naturalistic point of view, to which all of us at the outset are subject and which makes us incapable of prescinding from nature and hence, too, of making the psychical an object of intuitive investigation from the pure rather than from the psychological point of view, has here blocked the road to a great science unparalleled in its fecundity, a science which is on the one hand the fundamental condition for a completely scientific psychology and on the other field for genuine critique of reason. The spell of inborn naturalism also consists in the fact that it makes it so difficult for all of us to see “essences,” or “ideas”—or rather, since in fact we do, so to speak, constantly see them, for us to let them have the peculiar value which is theirs instead of absurdly naturalizing them (Hua XXV: 32 [110]).

Taking the essence of perception as an example, he explains how we intuit essences.

Intuiting essences conceals no more difficulties of “mystical” secrets than does perception. When we bring “color” to full intuitive clarity, to givenness for ourselves, then the datum is an “essence;” and when we likewise in pure intuition—looking, say, at one perception after another—bring to givenness for ourselves what “perception” is, perception in itself (this identical character of any number of flowing singular perception), then we have intuitively grasped the essence of perception (Hua XXV: 32 [110–111]).

At the end of “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” Husserl mentions the relationship between phenomenology, philosophy, and psychology. He holds that “[…] phenomenology […] constitutes the common foundation for every philosophy and psychology” (Hua XXV: 40 [120]).

So long as Husserl tells the difference between philosophy and psychology, it might be reasonable to talk about philosophical phenomenology and psychological phenomenology. As he indicates:

Only a really radical and systematic phenomenology, not carried on incidentally and in isolated reflections but in exclusive dedication to the extremely complex and confused problems of consciousness, and carried on with a completely free spirit blinded by no naturalistic prejudices, can give us an understanding of the “psychical”—in the sphere of social as well as of individual consciousness (Hua XXV: 39 [119]).

Yet Husserl does not go that far in “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911). His remarks on psychical phenomena suggests his strong interest to develop such a discipline as phenomenological psychology, but it is not until more than one decade later that he brings up the formal combination of psychology and phenomenology. The term of psychology still retains a negative tone throughout the 1910s, it denotes the discipline that originates in British empiricism, which focuses on the empirical facts of the psychical experiences. Psychology remains stocked with psychological naturalism (Hua XXV: 40 [121]) and is often formulated strictly as “empirical psychology” (Hua XXV: 25 [102]). It is no wonder that we witness the sharp contrast between phenomenology and psychology in Ideas I (1913), in which Husserl points out: “psychology studies empirical facts” whereas “phenomenology is the eidetic science of pure phenomenon” (Hua III/1: 6 [xx]). No sign is yet in sight that both phenomenology and psychology are concordant.

§ 3. Psychology in “Psychology and Phenomenology” (1917)

Husserl still insists on the distinction between phenomenology and psychology in this article published in 1917. He clarifies the essential characteristics of psychology and explains the reason why it has to be distinguished from psychology. However, he also points out that because of their common subject matter, both psychology and phenomenology are close to each other. A new type of psychology seems visible with the help of phenomenology. But let’s look at Husserl’s criticism of empirical psychology beforehand. He says in this paper: “Psychology is certainly a science about subjectivity, but this subjectivity is entangled with the body and connected with nature and only with the close connection with nature can the study of subjectivity be made possible” (Hua XXV: 102).

Such a psychology originated with British empiricism during the 18th century and was deeply involved in naturalism, as already pointed out in the previous section. Such a psychology emphasized the causal connection between conscious-acts. It had no inkling about the intentionality that makes up the essential characteristics of psychical phenomena at all. Later on, the concept of intentionality, though a tremendous contribution of Brentano, contributed little to the establishment of a new psychology, because Brentano knew nothing about the pure phenomenon, or the eidetic research of consciousness or psychical phenomena. In addition, both British empiricism and the school of Brentano shared the presupposition of the existence of objective reality, which constitutes the basis of their research of psychic phenomenon. In Husserl’s view, psychology is an objective science according to either British empiricism or the school of Brentano (Hua XXV: 103).

Throughout the article “Psychology and Phenomenology,” Husserl manages to distinguish psychology from phenomenology. However, it is also in this article that one may witness a kind of expectation that Husserl begets in regard to psychology. He sees the affinity of the psychological study of psychical phenomenon and the phenomenological study of pure consciousness, as he says:

As a matter of fact, the human consciousness and the consciousness of animals and plants (suppose we have evidence about them) are a doubtless, scientific theme, a descriptive and ascertainable theme in theory. Right at this point, the inner-descriptive psychology and phenomenology are close to each other […] (Hua XXV: 105).

We can see, perhaps for this reason, that Husserl had a great interest in transforming psychology, freeing it from naturalism and integrating it to phenomenology. The upgrade of psychology is quite comparable to the astrology and geometry one prior to purification. He says:

The psychology of today has not reached more than the level of rough observation and experiment, it is in principle similar to observational astronomy before the new astronomy based on the exact, mathematical physics had made its appearance, even before pure geometry had made its appearance (Hua XXV: 118).

What is at stake is the contrast between naturalism and apriorism. The hereto developed psychology focuses solely on empirical facts and neglects eidetic research. Husserl manages to transform psychology from the former to the latter and he confidently believes that a new psychology will show that “[…] the psychological field is going to be a tremendous field of rational knowledge, it will have great impact on the psychological empirical knowledge […]” (Hua XXV: 118).

Husserl considers aprioric psychology or rational psychology in a new sense. It has a close relationship to phenomenology, because “every result made by pure phenomenology can be applied to the aprioric psychology or rational psychology” (Hua XXV: 117).

As a consequence, even though Husserl had not yet used the term “phenomenological psychology,” its substantial meaning is already visible in the 1917 article “Phenomenology and Psychology.” It took him several years to come to unfold that new discipline systematically.

§ 4. Conclusion

My paper has elaborated how Husserl changed his viewpoint about psychology prior to the emergence of phenomenological psychology in the 1920s. Based on our elaboration, we see how Husserl shifted his viewpoint about the relationship between psychology and phenomenology between 1910 and 1920. The slow procedure from antithesis to synthesis is proven by analyzing the papers “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” (1911) and “Phenomenology and Psychology” (1917). I believe my elaboration has helped to clarify how Husserl developed the new discipline of phenomenological psychology in the 1920s.

References

Husserl, Edmund. 1950 ff. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke. Den Haag/ Dordrecht/London/New York: Martinus Nijhoff/Kluwer Academic Publishers/Springer.

Hua III/1. 1976. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Ed. Karl Schuhmann = 1982. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. Trans. Fred Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Hua VI. 1954. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Ed. Walter Biemel = 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Hua VIII. 1959. Erste Philosophie (1923-1924). Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Ed. Rudolf Boehm = 2019. First Philosophy: Lectures 1923/24 and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920–1925) (pp. 207–390, 442–663). Trans. Sebastian Luft and Thane M. Naberhaus. Dordrecht: Springer.

Hua IX. 1962. Phänomenologische Psychologie – Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925 (“Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925”, pp. 3–234; “Der Encyclopædia Britannica Artikel”, pp. 237–301; “Amsterdamer Vorträge: Phänomenologische Psychologie”, pp. 302–349). Ed. Walter Biemel = 1997. Phenomenological Psychology, Lectures, Summer Semester 1925. Trans. John Scanlon. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; = 1997. The Encyclopædia Britannica Article (pp. 83–196); The Amsterdam Lectures (1928) (pp. 197–253). In Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931). Ed. and trans. Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Hua XXV. 1987. Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911-1921) (“Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft”, pp. 3–62). Ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp = 1965. Philosophy as Rigorous Science (pp. 71–147). In Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Trans. Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

---