Phenomenological reflections on the disorienting effects of social acceleration

Alexis E. Gros^[2]

Abstract

Contemporary capitalist societies are accelerated social formations. Among other things, this means that they are characterized by constant and fast transformations in all spheres of life: technology, politics, culture, economy, etc. As experts in different disciplines argue, the dynamization of the lifeworld in late modernity has disturbing effects on subjective experience such as, for instance, the emergence of feelings of disorientation. In the present paper, I intend to analyze those effects phenomenologically. In order to do so, I will read Hartmut Rosa’s theory of social acceleration through the lens of Alfred Schutz’s social phenomenology.

    

Keywords: social acceleration; phenomenology; lifeworld; Alfred Schutz; Hartmut Rosa.

Resumen

Las sociedades capitalistas contemporáneas son formaciones sociales aceleradas. Entre otras cosas, esto significa que están marcadas por transformaciones constantes y cada vez más veloces en todos los planos de la vida: la tecnología, la política, la cultura, la economía, etc. De acuerdo con expertos de diferentes disciplinas, la dinamización del mundo de la vida tiene efectos perturbadores en la experiencia subjetiva, entre los cuales se cuenta la prevalencia de sentimientos de desorientación. En el presente texto, me propongo brindar un análisis fenomenológico de las consecuencias desorientadoras de la aceleración social tardo-moderna. Con este objetivo, llevo a cabo una relectura de la teoría de la aceleración social de Hartmut Rosa desde la perspectiva de la fenomenología social de Alfred Schutz.

    

Palabras clave: aceleración social; fenomenología; mundo de la vida; Alfred Schutz; Hartmut Rosa.

§ 1. Introduction

As many contemporary social theorists agree, late-modern societies—i.e., the capitalist social formations that have become established since the mid-1970s in the Western world—are accelerated social formations (Rosa & Scheuermann 2009; Rosa 2005; Fuchs, Iwer & Micali 2018). Among other things, this means that they are subject to fast transformations in all fundamental spheres of life. Indeed, nowadays not only technological structures, but also institutions, social practices, cultural patterns, political conjunctures and economic contexts experience constant and dramatic changes (Rosa 2009: 78 ff.).

According to experts in different disciplines, social acceleration has disturbing effects on subjective experience. These effects, it is argued, are reflected in the current prevalence of psychological disorders such as depression and burnout (Fuchs, Iwer & Micali 2018: 7).^[3] One of the most disturbing consequences of the dynamization of the lifeworld in late modernity is that individuals feel disoriented, insecure, and even disempowered, insofar as their skills and schemes of orientation become obsolete (CEDEFOP 2012; Rosa 2013: 380–382; 2009: 100; 2016a: 126–127).

The most thorough account of the speeding up of social life in late modernity is probably the one offered by the German sociologist Hartmut Rosa. In his most famous book, Beschleunigung: Die Veränderung der Zeitstrukturen in der Moderne (2005), and in other works (2016a; 2013; 2009), he develops a systematic and empirically founded theory of social acceleration (Rosa 2005: 56). This theory not only intends to describe and explain (late) modern acceleration on a macro-sociological level; it also studies its micro-sociological dimensions, that is, its effects on the subjective “relationship to the world” (Weltbeziehung) (Rosa 2013: 14). On this latter level, Rosa offers thought-provoking insights on the disorienting effects of the “acceleration of social change” on the experience of everyday actors (2016a: 126–127; 2013: 380–381; 2009: 100).^[4]

Arguably, what makes Rosa’s remarks on this matter interesting is that they are phenomenologically inspired: they attempt to echo the texture of lived experience (Rosa 2013: 7). However—and this is the starting point of my reflections in this paper—, Rosa does not operate with a thorough phenomenological analysis of lived temporality and its essential connections with everyday cognition and action, such as the ones offered by Husserl (Hua X), Heidegger (2006: 334 ff.), or Schutz (1981: 62 ff.). As I will argue here, such analyses are needed to refine and further develop Rosa’s micro-sociological insights.

In the present paper, I intend to show the possible contributions of Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology of the Lebenswelt to remedy the mentioned deficit in Rosa’s theory.^[5] More precisely, arguing from a Schutzian perspective, I claim that the disorienting effects of late-modern acceleration as described by Rosa are a consequence of the disruption of the—temporal, subjective, and social—conditions of possibility of the familiarity of the lifeworld.

In order to achieve the stated aim, I will proceed in three steps. First (§ 1), I will sketch Rosa’s theory of social acceleration, especially focusing on his thesis that the “contraction of the present” (Gegenwartsschrumpfung) in late modernity produces an erosion of the certitudes of everyday life. Second (§ 2), I will briefly present what Alfred Schutz considers the subjective, temporal, and social presuppositions of the familiarity of the lifeworld. Finally (§ 3), combining insights from both authors, I will try to develop a phenomenology-based ideal type of the disorienting effects of social acceleration on everyday experience.

§ 2. Hartmut Rosa’s theory of social acceleration and the “contraction of the present”

2.1. Social acceleration and its three dimensions

Hartmut Rosa provides a solid social-theoretical account of social acceleration in late modernity (2005; 2016a; 2013; 2009). According to this account, contemporary capitalist societies in the Western world are high-speed social formations; that is, they are essentially prone to accelerating because they are governed by an immanent “logic of increase” (Steigerungslogik). This “tendency to escalation” (Eskalationstendenz) implies that current societies can only stabilize themselves culturally, socially, and economically in a dynamic manner, i.e., by constantly growing, innovating, and speeding up (Rosa 2013: 14).

When it comes to defining late-modern social acceleration more precisely, Rosa argues that it constitutes a multifaceted process that can be analytically divided into three “fundamental dimensions,” namely: (a) “technological acceleration,” (b) “acceleration of social change,” and (c) “acceleration of the pace of life” (2009: 92 ff.; 2005: 462 ff.).

(a) Technological acceleration implies a progressive speeding up of “goal-directed processes of transport, communication, and production,” which is caused by ever-new technological developments (Rosa 2009: 82; 2005: 462). Consider, for example, the acceleration of communication made possible in the last twenty years by the Internet and mobile phones. Nowadays, we can reach people and transfer information much faster than we did in the 90s and early 2000s.

(b) In turn, Rosa understands the acceleration of social change as a constant increase of the “rates of social change” (soziale Veränderungsraten), that is, as a continuous escalation of the speed in which the fundamental socio-cultural structures of societies change—namely, forms of life, cultural patterns, stocks of knowledge, forms of social relations, etc. (2009: 83; 2005: 82 ff., 462). If technological acceleration indicates “acceleration processes within society,” this second kind of speeding-up implies an “acceleration of society itself” (Rosa 2009: 82, my emphasis). Think, for instance, of the novel social practices, forms of social interaction, and professions that are constantly arising—and dying away—as a consequence of ever-new internet-related innovations: WhatsApp groups, online dating through apps like Tinder, new kinds of jobs such as being a social media influencer on Instagram or an Uber driver, etc.^[6]

(c) Finally, Rosa speaks of a progressive acceleration of the “pace of life” (Lebenstempo) of individuals (2009: 85, my emphasis; 2005: 198). Put differently, late-modern subjects are forced to live and act ever faster in order to be able to keep up with the demands of the social world. For this reason, they tend to see time as scarce. They feel hurried and under heavy stress (Rosa 2009: 86; 2005: 463). Consider, for instance, the typical late-modern experience of being in a rush because of a demanding job or study-related deadline.

2.2. The acceleration of social change and the “contraction of the present”

In what follows, I will focus on the consequences of the second dimension of social acceleration—(b) the acceleration of social change—on the relationship to the world of late-modern subjects. On Rosa’s account, this kind of acceleration has disorienting effects on subjective experience (Rosa 2009: 88; 2005: 463).

Rosa’s argument can be read in the following manner: the speeding up of social change in late modernity produces an erosion of the reliable social practices, institutions, and cultural patterns that used to govern daily life in “classical modernity”—i.e., the period of Western modernity that stretches from the 1950s to the 1970s (Rosa, Strecker & Kottmann 2007: 26 ff.). This erosion, in turn, brings about a destabilization of the practical, cognitive, and orientation skills of everyday actors.

According to Rosa, this process is caused by a substantial modification of the social and subjective experience of time (2005: 462-463; 2016a: 23). More precisely, drawing upon the work of Hermann Lübbe (2009), Rosa claims that the acceleration of social change involves a significant transformation of the way in which social actors experience the present, namely, a progressive “contraction of the present” (Gegenwartsschrumpfung) (2016a: 23).

Following Lübbe (2009)—and, as I will show below, in a sense that is compatible with Schutz’s account of the present—, Rosa understands the socio-cultural present not as a punctual now, but rather as a relatively wide “space of time” (Zeitraum) (2016a: 23; 2005: 462). More specifically, the social present is a broad time lapse within which socio-cultural structures remain valid—in our present, for example, capitalism is the dominant economic system worldwide. By contrast, the social past encompasses practices, structures, and institutions that “are not valid anymore”—such as, for instance, the Fordist organization of work or the medieval system of Estates—, and the social future consists in structures that “are not yet valid”—i.e., new legal regulations that will be valid from next year (Rosa 2016a: 23).

According to Rosa, within the space of time socially considered as present, everyday subjects can have “reliable expectations” (Erwartungssicherheit) about the stability of socio-cultural reality and, therefore, can rely on their ability to anticipate the future based on prior experiences (2016a: 23). This is because there exists a coincidence between the “space of experience” (Erfahrungsraum) and the “horizon of expectation” (Erwartungshorizont) (Rosa 2016a: 23). Put differently, in the sociological present as conceptualized by Rosa, social actors can feel secure about the current validity of their previously acquired interpretive schemas and practical skills.

Now, for Rosa, because of the speeding up of the “rates of cultural and social innovation” in late modernity, the width of the socio-cultural present tends to shrink (2009: 83). In this sense, acceleration of social change can be understood as an exponential increase of “the decay rates of the reliability of experiences and expectations” that implies a “contraction of the time spans definable as the ‘present’” (Rosa 2009: 83–84).

Broadly speaking, the contraction of the present involves a progressive diminution of the space of time of stability within which institutions, practices, and stocks of knowledge remain socio-culturally valid (Rosa 2016a: 24; 2005: 462). Correlatively, this entails a decrease of the time lapse within which social agents can rely both on the stability of their “conditions of action” and on the effectiveness of their practical and interpretive skills (Rosa 2013: 209). Differently put, the contraction of the present involves a dissociation between the “temporal horizons of experience (Erfahrung) and expectation (Erwartung)” (2013: 211, my emphasis).

This contraction of the present, says Rosa, takes place in all fundamental spheres of social life: politics, economy, technology, science, arts, family practices, etc. (2016a: 24; 2009: 84). Therefore, it has significant effects on the manner in which individuals perceive their lives: late-modern subjects develop a “Kontingenzbewusstsein,” that is, an increasing awareness of the contingent character of their current status, circumstances, convictions, beliefs, and commitments (Rosa 2013: 207; 2009: 88). They are constantly aware that “[t]hings (jobs, spouses, religious, political, commitments) could be otherwise” (Rosa 2009: 88, my emphasis).^[7]

2.3. Three disorienting effects of the contraction of the present on subjective experience

As said in the Introduction, in many of his writings, Rosa gives interesting insights on the disorienting effects of the contraction of the present on everyday experience—or, to put it in his own terms, on the subjective “relationships to the world.” In the following, I will briefly touch upon three of these effects, namely: (a) skill obsolescence and cultural illiteracy, (b) the disruption of “cognitive-evaluative maps,” and (c) the crisis of long-term identity projects.

(a) According to Rosa, because of both the speeding up of social change and technological acceleration, late-modern societies are “disposable societies” (Wegwerfgesellschaften), that is, social formations in which things periodically become obsolete and are, time and again, replaced by new ones (2005: 379; 2016a: 63). For this reason, the material structures of late-modern lifeworlds are “transitory”: the objects we work, play, and live with are discarded and substituted by novel ones the moment they become “outdated” (Rosa 2013: 172–173).

Because of these constant transformations in the “objective world,” late-modern subjects lose their practical skills for dealing with it. “Assimilating” a novel object is necessarily a time-consuming (zeitaufwendig) process.^[8] However, in accelerated societies we usually do not have enough time for that. Things are replaced too fast for us to get to know them well (Rosa 2016a: 127, 129; 2013: 193).

Briefly, the rapid obsolescence of things in late modernity goes hand in hand with skill obsolescence. In this sense, late-modern subjects feel sometimes like cultural “illiterates,” insofar as they are confronted with alien things they never learned how to use or deal with. Interestingly enough, Rosa understands skill obsolescence and cultural illiteracy as forms of “alienation”—or “estrangement” (Entfremdung)—from the “objective” world (2016a: 129).^[9]

(b) Furthermore, Rosa argues that social actors always possess “cognitive-evaluative maps” (kognitiv-evaluative Landkarten) (2013: 380–381). These maps tell them where the “mountains and valleys” of the socio-cultural world are. Yet, because of the relentless “dynamization of society” in late modernity, “mountains and valleys”—everyday things, practices, institutions, etc.—are constantly changing their places. Consequently, the individuals’ cognitive-evaluative maps become anachronistic and have to be constantly updated (Rosa 2013: 382, 186).

(c) For Rosa, the contraction of the present implies also a substantial transformation of the way in which individuals temporally organize their lives (2009: 100). Classical modern subjects conceived their identities as “long-term projects supposed to evolve like a Bildungsroman;” that is, they could plan their entire biography in advance. This was made possible by the steadiness of core social institutions such as family and work (Rosa 2009: 100).

By contrast, because of the contraction of the present, late-modern subjects are not able anymore to plan their lives ahead: socio-cultural reality simply changes too fast for that to be possible. In this context, says Rosa, a new kind of identity emerges: “situational identity” (situative Identität) (2009: 101; 2005: 373; 2016a: 63). If individuals want to be “successful”—or even to “survive”—in accelerated and competitive societies, they have to be flexible to everyday contingencies and give up the ambition of making long-term plans. This explains the feelings of lack of autonomy and “directionlessness” typical of late-modern individuals (Rosa 2009: 101; 2013: 260).

§ 3. Alfred Schutz on the conditions of possibility of the “familiarity” of the lifeworld

I now move on to consider Schutz’s phenomenological reflections on the conditions of possibility of the familiarity—or taken-for-grantedness—of the lifeworld. As I will show in § 4, my claim is that the contraction of the present as described by Rosa systematically undermines these conditions of possibility. If one follows this idea, the disorienting effects of social acceleration can be regarded as a consequence of the defamiliarization of the Lebenswelt.

Following Husserl (Hua VI: § 17),^[10] Schutz argues that one of the essential attributes of a normal daily lifeworld is its familiarity and taken-for-grantedness (Selbstverständlichkeit) (2003: 327; 1994: 247).^[11] Except in times of crisis, our everyday lifeworld manifests itself as the unquestionable “ground” (Boden) of our praxis and cognition (Schutz 1964: 96). Also inspired by the father of phenomenology (Hua III/1: §§ 27–30)—and this is crucial for my argument—, Schutz does not understand this familiarity as an objective feature of the lifeworld—i.e., as an attribute of the world in-itself (1962: 207 ff.). Rather, he conceives it as a correlate of a subjective attitude that is socio-culturally preformed, namely, the “natural attitude” (natürliche Einstellung)—this understood as the naïve, unreflective, and pragmatic-oriented stance everyday actors usually adopt (Schutz 1962: 207 ff.; 1994: 246, 311).

Arguably, one of the main goals of Schutzian phenomenology is to explore the subjective and socio-cultural conditions of possibility of the familiarity of the everyday lifeworld. He achieves this aim by means of a full-fledged analysis of the natural attitude that goes beyond the one given by Husserl (Natanson in Schutz 1962: XVII ff.). Broadly speaking, Schutz conceives the natural attitude—which he also calls “common-sense thinking” (Common-Sense-Denken) (Schutz 1994: 331; 1962: 7)—as a complex “texture” of implicit, automatic, and indubitable assumptions about the nature of the everyday lifeworld (Natanson in Schutz 1962: XVII, my emphasis).

In what follows, I will sketch Schutz’s account of the conditions of possibility of the familiarity of the Lebenswelt, putting special emphasis on its temporal-theoretical aspects. In order to achieve this aim, the present section will be divided into three parts. First (3.1.), I will discuss Schutz’s analysis of the two fundamental common-sense assumptions that ensure the familiarity of the lifeworld: the assumptions of typicality and constancy; second (3.2.), I will outline the phenomenological conception of temporality on which these assumptions rest; and finally (3.3.), I will focus on Schutz’s analysis of the socio-cultural presuppositions of the latter.

3.1. The assumptions of typicality and constancy

According to Schutz, the natural attitude does not merely consist in what Husserl calls the “general thesis of the natural attitude”—i.e., the belief in the objective existence of the external world (Hua III/1: § 30). Rather, it also includes other implicit assumptions, theses, and idealizations concerning the nature of things, time, space, and the subjectivities of Others (Schutz 1994: 217; 2003: 137; Natanson in Schutz 1962: XVII ff.). I will now discuss two of these assumptions that are critical for ensuring the familiarity of the Lebenswelt, namely, the assumptions of (a) typicality and (b) constancy. As it will be shown (c), the former is essentially founded upon the latter.

(a) The first of these common-sense assumptions is that the lifeworld possesses a typical structure which is pre-known (Schutz 2003: 327; Gros 2017b). Inspired by Husserl’s genetic-phenomenological reflections on the typicality of pre-predicative experience (1972: § 8), Schutz argues that ordinary human beings do not experience lifeworldly things, events, and situations as meaningless sensorial data, let alone as unique and unrepeatable phenomena (1962: 7; 1964: 285). Rather, they see them “from the outset”—i.e., immediately and with no need of performing complex cognitive acts—as exemplars of known empirical types (Schutz 1962: 59, my emphasis)—namely: as dogs, trees, tables, football matches, rock concerts, and so on (Schutz 1962: 59).

Following Husserl (1972: 33 [36])—and this is crucial—, Schutz claims that thanks to this typical knowledge, pre-scientific individuals develop a bond of non-problematic familiarity (Vertrautheit) with the world (1964: 108; 2003: 327). Put differently, the Lebenswelt appears to them as a “horizon of typical familiarity and pre-acquaintanceship” (Schutz 1962: 50).

Thus, Schutz claims that the world of daily life is normally given to us as a meaningful web of typical events, objects, social roles, institutions, signs, etc., that are familiar to us (1964: 231). This is possible because, at every moment of our lives, we possess a “stock of knowledge” (Wissensvorrat) at hand, which operates as our taken-for-granted “scheme of interpretation” or “of reference” for understanding the lifeworld and finding our bearings in it (Schutz 1964: 281; 1962: 7). In line with Husserl’s reflections on subjective habits (Hua I: § 32), Schutz understands the stock of knowledge as a “system” of “habitualities” that is nothing but a “sedimentation” of a “particular history” (2011: 190; 1964: 283).

More precisely, the stock of knowledge is made-up by a set of cognitive and practical typifications (Typisierungen) to which social actors routinely “resort”—i.e., automatically, by means of passive syntheses—for defining and mastering situations and segments of the daily lifeworld (Schutz, 1962: 9 ff.; 1996: 14–15). Arguably, the former kind of typifications provides the subjects with a general knowledge of the “typical style” in which certain typical objects “manifest themselves” (Schutz 1964: 284), whereas the latter gives them a “cookbook knowledge” for acting in the world—i.e., practical recipes that indicate “typical means” for achieving “typical ends” in “typical situations” (Schutz 1996: 14–15; 1994: 267).^[12]

Interestingly enough, Schutz also understands the stock of knowledge at hand as a common-sense map that allows individuals to orient themselves in their lifeworld: “The man raised in a city will orient himself with the help of habits he has acquired in his daily life” (1996: 9).

(b) The second common-sense presupposition I want to discuss concerns the anticipation of future events and is closely linked to the first one. According to Schutz, in normal conditions, everyday individuals assume that their lifeworld will remain relatively stable through time, i.e., that, in the future, things will be typically similar to the way they were in the past (1994: 217; 1964: 285).

More specifically, Schutz speaks of a set of “fundamental assumptions concerning the constancy” (Grundannahmen der Konstanz) of the Lebenswelt (1994: 217; 2003: 327).^[13] These assumptions, he says, are crystallized into two implicit “idealizations” originally conceptualized by Husserl, namely: the idealization of “and so forth and so on” (und so weiter) and the one of “I can do it again” (ich kann immer wieder). Arguably, the former implies the assumption of the stability of the structure of the world and, in this sense, belongs to the noematic—or objective—side of the intentional correlation: it is the assumption that the lifeworld qua noema will remain stable. The latter, in turn, belongs to the noetic or—subjective—side: it involves the assumption of the further validity of our stock of knowledge (Schutz 1964: 285).^[14]

(c) It could be argued that, for Schutz, the assumption of typicality (a) is founded upon the fundamental assumptions of constancy (b) (1964: 283 ff.). Indeed, typifications can only operate as reliable schemes if one assumes the relative constancy of the lifeworld.^[15] To claim that something is typical means to claim that it has a recurrent or routine nature. As Schutz himself writes:

Presupposing such a typicality (and any typicality) means assuming that what has been proved to be typical in the past will have a good chance to be typical in the future, or, in other words, that life will continue to be what it has been so far (1964: 112).

Following Husserl, Schutz argues that apprehending an object, an event or a situation as an exemplar of a type implies passively anticipating—i.e., “protentioning”—its forthcoming features (1972: 399 [331–332]). For instance, the moment I see “a dog” as such, I immediately anticipate its typical mode of behavior: it will bark, eat, run, and jump as typical “dogs” do (Husserl 1972: 399 [331–332]). In Schutz’s words: “In common-sense thinking these anticipations and expectations follow basically the typical structures that have held good so far for our past experiences and are incorporated in our stock of knowledge at hand” (1964: 285).

3.2. The “specious present” as wide and stable

Schutz’s analysis of the assumptions of typicality and constancy is based on a phenomenological account of time, that is, on a description of the basal structures of the subjective experience of temporality.^[16] This account is mainly inspired by Husserl’s Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (Hua X), but also draws on insights from William James (1890) and Henri Bergson’s (1965) works.

In what follows, I shall restrict myself to consider Schutz’s conception of the width of the present, which is crystallized in his use of James’ concept of “specious present” (Schutz 1996: 257; 1964: 291). Arguably, this conception is structurally similar to—and therefore compatible with—Rosa’s account of the socio-cultural present: both conceive the present (a) an extended space of time, which is relatively stable (b).

(a) Schutz criticizes the theories that understand the present as a knife-edge instant that is sharply circumscribed from both the past and the future: “The present of our vivid experiences is never a mathematical point, a mere instant, an ideal limit between past and future” (Schutz 1996: 257, my emphasis).^[17] By contrast, in line with James (1890: 609) and Husserl (Hua X: 19, 31, 39 [19–20, 33, 41]) he describes it as a “specious” and wide temporal field. Indeed, according to Schutz, we experience the present as an extended lapse of time, which contains both memories and expectations: “The present we are living in is always a specious present, as James calls it, having itself its structuration, having a before and an after” (1996: 257; 1964: 291).

More specifically, drawing on Husserl (Hua X: §§ 11, 12, 24), Schutz thinks that the specious present or “originary temporal field” (originäres Zeitfeld) can be analytically divided into three moments or proto-acts (1981: 64 ff.; 1996: 256 ff.), namely: (i) the primal impression (Urimpression), (ii) the retention (Retention), and (iii) the protention (Protention) (Zahavi, 2003: 83 ff.).

When we experience an intentional object, (i) the primal impression is narrowly directed to its now-slice, that is, it apprehends what is occurring right now (Schutz 1981: 64 ff.; 1996 256 ff.; Hua X: 29 [31]). (ii) The retention, in turn, keeps preserved the just-elapsed slice of the object; or, to put it in Schutz’s words, it is a “still-consciousness (noch-Bewußtsein)” of the primal impression that has just occurred (1981: 64). “Although it sinks into the past, the actual experience is still retained, and, therefore, the term retention has been used for this special type of remembrance” (Schutz 1996: 256, my emphasis). (iii) Finally, the protention is a more or less empty anticipation of the slice of the object, which, supposedly, is “about to occur” (Schutz 1981: 75; 1996: 252; Hua X: 52–53 [54–55]; Zahavi, 2012: 152). “Any experience refers likewise to the future. It carries along protentions of occurrences to follow immediately” (Schutz 1964: 285).

Consider, for instance, the way in which we experience musical melodies. Listening to melodies would be impossible if the lived present was a knife-edge instant. In order for us to be able to listen to a melody as such—and not just to isolated notes or sounds—, the present has to be wide: while listening to the now sounding note, we have to be able to retain the notes that have just passed and to anticipate the ones that will come (Schutz 1996: 256; Hua X: 11 [12]).

In line with Husserl (Hua X: 118 [122]), Schutz argues that both retentions and protentions are proto-acts that “attach themselves automatically and without interruption” to primal impressions (1996: 256, my emphasis). More precisely, they are passive syntheses that, in a non-thematic and implicit manner, refer to the immediate past and the immediate future, respectively. In this sense, they must be sharply distinguished from “reproductions” and “anticipations” in a strict sense.^[18] The latter are proper intentional acts of “presentification” (Vergegenwärtigung) that explicitly thematize “more remote pasts” and “events and experiences of the more distant future” (Schutz 1996: 256).

Along with the just-analyzed conception of the present stricto sensu, Schutz also provides an even broader account of it (1964: 285; 1996: 59). According to this account, the specious present does not merely include retentions and protentions, but also proper reproductions and anticipations.

In my view, this broader conception of the specious present makes it possible to do justice to the actual width of our pre-theoretical experience of the present. When I say, for instance, “I am writing a philosophical paper right now,” the present I am living in goes beyond the structure “primal impression-retention-protention”. This has two reasons: first, because what we experience as the present is not an isolated specious present, but rather a flux of interconnected time fields; second, because our lived present also includes proper reproductions and anticipations. For example, while writing the present paper, I recollect my prior writing experiences and I anticipate the way my colleagues will read it.

According to Schutz, a special sort of anticipations plays a key role in structuring our experience of the present, namely, the “projects” (Entwürfe) or plans of action (1964: 291; 1962: 210; 1981: 86). The “span” of our projects, he says, is what ultimately defines “the limits of the specious present” in this broader sense, i.e., its beginning and ending (Schutz 1962: 219). For instance, when I say, “I have been working on this paper since last year,” this means that I have been living for months in a “long-term present” which is circumscribed by my plan of writing this text.

On Schutz’s account, a human conduct “based on a preconceived project” is an “action” (Handeln) (Schutz 1964: 289; 1981: § 9). The individual, however, does not plan all the details of her future action qua “ongoing process”—i.e., the actio—, but rather its intended outcome or purpose (Zweck) in the “future perfect tense”—that is, the actum. She visualizes herself “at a future time” when the action “will already have been accomplished” (Schutz 1964: 289). If we had to plan all the single steps involved in our everyday actions, we probably would not be able to act at all: we would lose a lot of precious time and energy. This shortcut is made possible by our stock of knowledge (Schutz 1964: 290).

Importantly, for Schutz our projects of action are never isolated (1962: 93; 1964: 290–291). Rather, they are integrated into broader plans—“for the hour or the year, for work or for leisure,” which, in turn, are ultimately subordinated to the “most universal” of our projects: “our plan of life.” For instance, my current project of writing this paper is embedded in a wider research plan, which, in turn, is subordinated to my plan of devoting my working life to doing philosophy.

(b) Furthermore, Schutz conceives the specious present as stable (1996: 257, 285). Following Husserl, he claims that protentions are essentially founded on and informed by—fresh and sedimented—retentions, meaning that we tend to expect that things will be typically similar to the way they were in the past. For instance, “if I have been perceiving an enduring sound of a specific, unchanged pitch, I may assume that his sound will have the same pitch in the following fraction of time” (Schutz 1996: 257).

Of course, this also holds for thematic anticipations. In this sense, our projects of action are essentially based on the typifications stored away in our stock of knowledge: “I base my projecting of the forthcoming act in the future perfect tense on my experiences of previously performed acts typically similar to the projected one. These pre-experiences are elements of my stock of knowledge at hand at the time of projecting” (Schutz 1964: 290).

This is so because, as said above, our common-sense thinking is pervaded by the assumptions of typicality and constancy: “What we are foreseeing,” claims Schutz, “is suggested by the general style or type of our past experiences or by the assumption that things will continue to be what they have been so far, and that what has proved to be typical in the past will also be typical in the future” (1996: 256).

3.3. Socio-cultural conditions of possibility of the familiarity of the lifeworld

However, this is only half of the story. From a Schutzian perspective, the familiarity of the lifeworld depends on the prevalence of specific socio-cultural conditions. According to Schutz, arguably, the two common-sense assumptions discussed above can only work properly if the individual is (a) successfully socialized into a social “in-group” that (b) lives in a relative stable or routine cultural lifeworld (1964: 91 ff., 106 ff., 226 ff.).^[19]

(a) For Schutz, social actors acquire the assumption of typicality through institutionalized processes of acculturation in which they learn how to define and master their in-group’s lifeworld (1962: 13; 1964: 282; 2003: 330). Indeed, only a very small part of the typical knowledge stored away in the Wissensvorrat originates as a result of the individuals’ own experiences: its “greater portion” is “socially derived,” “socially distributed,” and “socially approved” (Schutz 19942: 251). More precisely, it is “handed down” to individuals in “long”—i.e., time-consuming—“process(es) of education (Erziehung)”—or, to put it in more current terms, in processes of “primary” and “secondary” socialization (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 129 ff.)—which begin in early childhood and stretch into adulthood (Schutz 2003: 330; 1962, 13).

In these processes, social actors acquire and sediment the “culture” (Kultur) or “relative natural conception of the world” (relativ natürliche Weltanschauung) of the in-group to which they belong. Broadly speaking, Schutz understands culture as a system of typifications and relevances that is socially accepted and “taken for granted beyond question” by the group members (2011, 285; 1962, 348). This system of knowledge operates as a habitualized “common scheme of interpretation” (gemeinsames Interpretationsschema), which regulates the “way of life” (Lebensform) of the social group (2003: 330; 1964: 108–109).

(b) As mentioned above, common sense typifications are essentially founded on the assumptions of constancy. I would like to claim that, for Schutz, the latter can only work properly if they are not mere assumptions, that is, if the group’s cultural lifeworld is effectively stable through time. Otherwise, actual experience would systematically disappoint our idealizations of constancy and therefore also our typical expectations. Put differently, if a group’s lifeworld is not constant—for instance, because it changes too fast—the cognitive and practical typifications acquired in socialization processes tend to become obsolete: they lose their adequacy for dealing with the socio-cultural environment.

In this sense, the routinization of social life seems to play a key role in ensuring the familiarity of the Lebenswelt. As Schutz suggests, individuals feel “at home” within a group when life “follows an organized pattern of routine,” that is, when “it has its well-determined goals and well-proved means to bring them about, consisting of a set of traditions, habits, institutions, timetables for activities of all kinds, etc.” (1964: 108). Since routine situations occur repeatedly, there is no need to “define or redefine” them over and over. In these recurrent situations, human action “shows all the marks of habituality, automatism, and half-consciousness” (Schutz 1964: 101).

Briefly put, both the assumptions of typicality and constancy can only exist and work properly if two socio-cultural conditions are met: (a) if the individuals successfully acquire the culture of the in-group through time-consuming processes of learning and socialization, and (b) if the cultural lifeworld remains relatively stable through time; that is, if it shows a routine pattern that systematically confirms the typifications learned in the past.

As I will show below, these two conditions are systematically undermined by the acceleration of social change as analyzed by Rosa.

§ 4. The dynamization and defamiliarization of the lifeworld: reading Rosa through the lens of Schutzian phenomenology

Based on the theoretical compatibilities between Rosa’s and Schutz’s accounts of temporality, and in line with the methodological reflections of the latter concerning the construction of ideal-typical models of social action (Schutz: 1962: 27 ff.), I will try in the following to develop a phenomenologically based ideal type of the disorienting effects of social acceleration. This ideal type, I claim, will shed some new light on the nature of late-modern lifeworlds.

My simplified model is based on the following thesis: the feelings of disorientation described by Rosa are produced by a process of defamiliarization of the lifeworld that follows from its relentless dynamization. More specifically, I argue that the speeding up of social change systematically undermines the above discussed conditions of possibility of the familiarity of the Lebenswelt.

To put it even more precisely, my claim is that the dynamization of the lifeworld causes the crisis of the fundamental assumptions of constancy (4.1.), which, in turn, provokes the obsolescence of the stocks of knowledge (4.2.) and precludes social actors from planning their long-term future (4.3.).^[20]

4.1. The crisis of the fundamental assumptions of constancy

As said, according to Schutz, the socio-cultural lifeworld into which we are socialized normally appears as a familiar and taken-for-granted milieu. Within it, we feel oriented and even “at home.” In the natural attitude, we assume that the Lebenswelt possesses a pre-known typical structure: it is composed of typical things, events, and situations that are related to each other in a typical manner. As I suggested above, the typical familiarity of the lifeworld rests on the fundamental assumptions of constancy, and these, in turn, can only work properly if the lifeworld effectively remains stable through time.

More specifically, the idealizations of “and so forth and so on” and of “I can do it again” inform the protentions and anticipations encompassed in our specious present. That is, we automatically tend to expect that the world and our relationship to it will keep their typical features in the future. Since in normal conditions of sociality, the lifeworld effectively remains constant—i.e., it follows a pattern of routine—, our typical expectations are systematically confirmed on a daily basis.

Following this line of thought, Schutz describes the common-sense anticipations of a typical US citizen in the 1950s in the following manner:

I “know” that tomorrow will be Friday, that people in the United States will file their income-tax returns on or before April 15, that every year the total of retail sales in New York during the month of December will be higher that during August, that in the first week of November 1964 a person born in the United States nor later than 1934, most probably a white male, will be elected President of the United States (Schutz 1964: 282).

Yet what happens when the lifeworld becomes dynamic? As said, Rosa argues that the dynamization of society in late modernity implies a progressive “contraction of the present:” the space of time within which institutions, structures, and practices remain socio-culturally valid tends to decrease, and this entails a progressive diminution of the time lapse within which individuals can rely on the stability of their conditions of action.

From a Schutzian perspective, it can be argued that the contraction of the socio-cultural present goes hand in hand with the narrowing of the subjective—specious—present. More precisely put, the contraction of the present produces a crisis of the idealizations of constancy and, therefore, a destabilization of the individual’s horizons of future: it undermines our idealizations of “and so forth and so on” and of “I can do it again.”

Late-modern individuals experience that many of their typical protentions and anticipations lose their validity when confronted with a dynamized Lebenswelt. Instead of being confirmed by actual experiences, they tend to be systematically disappointed. For this reason, social agents can no longer assume the constancy of the world—or they can only assume it for ever-shorter time frames.

To be sure, this crisis of the idealizations of constancy does not mean that the lived present stops being wide—i.e., that it does not encompass protentions and anticipations anymore. Rather, my claim is that in accelerated societies, social actors develop new idealizations to replace the ones of constancy. These new idealizations are of two kinds, namely, (i) idealizations of contingency—“It might be different,” “I might not be able to do it again”—, which follow from what Rosa calls the increasing “awareness of contingency” (Kontingenzbewusstsein), and (ii) idealizations of inconstancy—“It will be different,” “I will not be able to do it again.” Arguably, while the idealizations of constancy conceptualized by Schutz motivate subjective feelings of orientation, certainty, security, and potency, the ones of contingence and inconstancy motivate experiences of disorientation, uncertainty, insecurity, and impotence.

In light of these reflections, it is easy to see why Schutz’s description of the common-sense expectations of a typical US citizen in the 1950s sounds so odd to late-modern ears. In contrast to the social actor described by Schutz, a late-modern individual—be it American or not—cannot be so certain about the economic, cultural, and political future of her country. This is so because of the fast social and technological changes in all spheres of life.

4.2. The obsolescence of the stocks of knowledge

The dynamization of the lifeworld also provokes the obsolescence of the stocks of knowledge. In my view, taking this precarization of everyday knowledge into account is essential to properly understand the feelings of disorientation and disempowerment typical of late-modern subjects.

As said, on Schutz’s account, the stock of knowledge operates as a taken-for-granted scheme of reference and orientation that enables the individuals to define and deal with typical situations, events, and artifacts. In this sense, it can be seen as a common-sense “map” that orients social actors and provides them with a familiarity with the lifeworld. From this follows that the obsolescence or precarization of the Wissensvorrat may provoke feelings of disorientation and defamiliarization.

The obsolescence of the stock of knowledge is closely linked to the crisis of the assumptions of constancy. As stated above, typifying something implies assuming that the thing at stake has constant features. Now, if our idealizations of constancy collapse and are replaced by idealizations of inconstancy or contingency, our stock of knowledge necessarily enters into a crisis. Either we are sure that we cannot rely anymore on it—idealizations of inconstancy—or are uncertain about it still being valid —idealizations of contingency.

More precisely, our sedimented typifications can only be pragmatically “successful” if the lifeworld remains relatively stable, that is, if things do not constantly change their typical attributes. However, because of the dynamization of the Lebenswelt, the typical protentions stored away in our Wissensvorrat begin to be systematically disappointed. This inevitably causes the obsolescence of our stock of knowledge at hand.

Take, for instance, the processes of “skill obsolescence” that, according to institutions such as the CEDEFOP—the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training—are taking place nowadays in the working world. “Rapid labor market changes,” claims this agency in a 2012 study, “leave too many workers at risk of losing their skills” (CEDEFOP 2012).

However, this is not all. As suggested above, Schutz emphasizes that the processes of learning through which individuals acquire stocks of knowledge are essentially time-consuming and socially mediated. Arguably, because of the relentless dynamization of the lifeworld, individuals do not have enough time at disposal for learning the skills needed for dealing with the novel things, events, and situations that emerge every day. Furthermore, the fluidification of social groups, milieus, and institutions taking place in accelerated societies aggravate the problem, insofar it destabilizes and undermines socialization processes (Rosa 2005: 371 ff.; Rosa, Strecker & Kottmann 2007: 210 ff.).

From a Schutzian perspective, thus, the obsolescence of the stocks of knowledge is also closely linked to deficiencies related to learning, training, and education. This view can be also corroborated in light of the study of the CEDEFOP: “a supportive learning culture in the enterprise […] can prevent or moderate loss of skills […]. Formal instruction or training during working hours is the most effective way to counter skill obsolescence” (2012).

4.3. The impossibility of making plans for the long-term future

Schutz’s theory of the lifeworld can also help better understand the problems late-modern subjects face when planning ahead their lives and developing personal identities. Arguably, if the obsolescence of skills has mainly to do with a destabilization of our typical protentions—i.e., to our relationship with the immediate future—, the problems concerning identity development are related to the disruption of our thematic anticipations of the long-term future.

As suggested above, for Schutz, our projects of action and thus our “plans of life” are essentially founded upon the assumptions of typicality and constancy. These assumptions, in turn, can only work properly under the conditions of a stable lifeworld: long-term life plans are only possible when the Lebenswelt remains relatively stable. Now, as said, because of the dynamization of the lifeworld in late modernity, our assumptions of constancy collapse and our stocks of knowledge become obsolete. Consequently, we progressively lose our capacity to make long-term plans for the future.

A good way to illustrate this is to compare the typical working career of late-modern subjects with the one of classical modern individuals. The latter tended to remain in the same job—or at least in the same company—for their entire work life; this gave them the necessary stability for planning ahead long-term life projects (think, for instance, of the workers of Ford in the 1950s). The former, by contrast, are obliged to change jobs and companies repeatedly, and they have no idea where they will end up working four or five years from now. Briefly, the accelerated changes in work conditions in late modernity prevent individuals from autonomously planning their lives in advance.

§ 5. Instead of a conclusion

For the sake of clarity and systematicity, instead of writing a standard conclusion, I would like to finish this paper with a schematic table comparing the model of the disorienting effects of social acceleration—sketched in § 4—with the ideal type of familiarity and stability that follows from my remarks in § 3.

Ideal Type 1 (§ 3)	Ideal Type 2 (§ 4)
Stable Lifeworld – Classical Modernity (and Pre-Modernity)	Dynamized Lifeworld – Late Modernity
Assumptions of constancy	Assumptions of contingency and inconstancy
Assumption of typicality—well-functioning stocks of knowledge	Obsolescence of the stocks of knowledge
Institutionalized socialization processes	Deinstitutionalization of socialization processes
Routine	Deroutinization
Adequate of common-sense maps	Inadequacy of common-sense maps
Identity as long-term project	Impossibility of making long-term plans
Familiarity – orientation	Defamiliarization – disorientation

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