The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the study of the relationship between the State and the law, a central theme in State theory, based on the contributions made by Hermann Heller. In particular, we intend to review how the author conceived the State, the law, and the relationship between them, taking into account the conceptual shifts that can be found throughout his work.

The underlying hypothesis of this research assumes that, based on the way he approaches the subject at hand, Heller’s work can be divided into two stages. The first, we assert, extends between 1924 and 1927, while the second begins in 1928 and concludes with the author’s death in 1933. We believe that around 1928 there is a change in how he conceives the State and the law, and especially the relationship between them, and that this change is related to a modification of his theoretical-political adversary. In the first stage, the positivism of the Kelsenian type is the main opponent, while in the second vitalism predominates, which, according to our author, is expressed in the field of State theory by Carl Schmitt. Thus, we pick up on an intuition that is suggested – but less explored than it deserves to be – by the specialized literature.

We make it clear that this approach does not imply stating that Heller’s work lacks unity and is therefore merely a reaction to other theoretical efforts. On the contrary, we believe that it constitutes an autonomous and original study of the central problems of State theory. However, this doesn’t prevent us from identifying relevant shifts that allow us to establish two stages in his work.

To achieve the stated aims, a three-part procedure is employed. First, we present the trends against which our author writes. This involves recovering both the main theoretical postulates of their most prominent figures, as well as explicating their metaphysical and ethical assumptions. Here, we follow Heller himself, who points out that no theory dealing with human phenomena can do away with assumptions of that kind, even if it pretends to. Second, we offer a systematization of Heller’s ethical and metaphysical assumptions and examine their connection with those of his adversary. Third, we analyze how he conceives the State, the law, and the relationship between them, and how this is linked to his metaphysical and ethical ideas. This procedure unfolds in two chapters, each dedicated to one of the aforementioned stages.