Maxime Schirrer^[1]

Abstract

This chapter explores how geography can contribute to the study of gray zones. Using dark stores as an example, it looks at the spatial aspect of gray zones and shows how they represent a new form of production of space. Given this, it then considers what conception of the urban they embody and what consequences they have for the management of public space. 
   
Keywords: Public space; territory; digital platforms; dark stores; production of space; gray zone.

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[T]he dark side of individualism is a centring on the self, which both flattens and narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, and less concerned with others or society.

    

Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 1991

This chapter seeks to highlight the spatial aspect of gray zones in work and employment. These have been studied by a number of disciplines since the idea was first put forward by legal theorist Alain Supiot in the early 2000s. Over the last decade, however, they have received most attention in sociology, notably as throwing light on the formation of the working conditions of “the post-Fordist worker” discussed by Donna Kesselman in her entry, under that heading, in a sociological dictionary of the gray zone (2019).

What would it mean, to take a spatial approach to gray zones? Every job has a spatial aspect, in its location, of course, and sometimes by virtue of its nature, as in the case of delivery work. The idea of the gray zone, understood as a space of social deregulation, thus raises distinctive questions about recent changes in the relation between work and space. Firstly, does the gray zone, in fact, find expression in space? Is it a spatial object, as the title of this chapter suggests, and if so, what might that say about how it should be approached, conceptually and methodologically?

After a preliminary consideration of the gray zone as concept, we shall go on to look at its spatial manifestation, notably its impact on the use of space. As it happens, the case of France’s dark stores can serve as a good illustration. Dark stores are premises where goods are stocked in order to fulfil local online orders for convenience products, and in its decision of 23 March 2023, the Conseil d’État—France’s highest administrative court—determined that such premises fell under the use class of warehouse. Consequently, “as warehouses, they cannot be established in vacant retail premises without permission for change of use. Local authorities may then refuse permission having regard to the local planning rules in force.”^[2] This decision allowed city authorities to bring proceedings against those who had taken advantage of the legal vacuum to establish dark stores in ground-floor premises normally reserved for retail. What might have looked like the resolution of a legal quibble in the reclassification of supposed retail premises as warehouses, led in a few months to their disappearance from France’s streets.

Analysis of the experiment is highly instructive. The dark store represented, in fact, a disruptive object that could not be understood in the customary terms, precisely because it existed in an ecosystem of its own making. The analysis of that ecosystem that follows is intended to throw light on the interaction between a model of economic development issuing from the digital platform economy and the public space in which it is deployed. Reliant on a questionable blurring of the definition of retail space, France’s dark stores were an attempt to evade planning law. In examining the conflicts and contradictions that this led to, the chapter offers a narrative of sorts, a novel account of the tensions produced by the gray zone’s materialization in the urban fabric.

Approaching Gray Zones Through Geographical Concepts

Geography, as a discipline, offers a distinctive understanding of social reality in its analysis of human societies in terms of their spatiality. In other words, geography studies the materiality of social facts in space.

A geographical analysis of the gray zone, then, will examine gray zones in work and employment in relation to social geographical space, asking: What is their effect, if any, on the human interactions occurring in the space concerned? The argument here will focus more specifically on the impact of gray zones on public space, and their effects on private space thus fall outside the scope of discussion. This is easily understandable: the multitude of bicycle delivery riders to be found in the public realm, waiting to pick up orders or on their way to deliver them, shows that public space represents an integral element of the sector’s value chain. In other words, use of the public domain is integral to the economic model, in that it is essential to the economic activity: mobility is integral to the services provided, where it does not represent the most added value in the transaction as a whole. A counter-example might be a fast-food establishment like Pizza Hut, which once used to harbor a fleet of scooters on its own—private—property.

A parallel might be drawn with free-floating mobility: the e-scooters offered for hire by private operators have invaded public space in being made completely self-service; this involves the same free use of the public domain for the purpose of profit-making as does delivery. France brought such services under public control with the Loi d’Orientation des Mobilités of September 2019,^[3] which provided the legal framework for the use of engins de déplacements personnels motorisés (motorized personal mobility devices) and gave local authorities powers to regulate them (Vidal et al. 2025). We shall have occasion to return to such “privatizations” of public space, another example of the blurring of boundaries characteristic of the gray zone.

Among the abundant scholarly literature on the gray zone (for a conspectus on which, see Kesselman 2016; Bureau et al. 2019; Bellemare et al. 2022), one of the most notable contributions is perhaps Patrick Cingolani’s analysis of the digital platform economy in La colonisation du quotidien, which sees the digital platforms as the culmination of the marked trend to the out-sourcing of labor observable over the last half-century (Cingolani 2021).

The account given here of the relations between the gray zones of the digital platform economy and public space highlights the material use of the public domain as a key element in the production and value chains of digital platform firms. In this respect, the notion of the gray zone helps us make sense of a new way of organizing society, whose underlying principle—of social deregulation—contributes much to the tensions manifest in urban space. We shall here be looking at urban rather than rural space, as the tensions that appear there seem more representative of the phenomenon: how many bicycle delivery riders, after all, does one see on country lanes? It is indeed not possible to serve rural destinations within the 10-15 minutes delivery time customarily promised. There is thus a very strong link between metropolization, whose essential feature is the concentration of both wealth and population, and the development of the digital platform economy. The quest for centrality is another key factor in the spatial expression of gray zones, driven by concerns for accessibility and consumer catchment area. A question of market, quite simply! No geographical space, no digital economy! Virtual space, defined as the immaterial locus of digital transactions, is no more than a means of intermediating individuals themselves located in physical space. The appropriation of public space by digital platform firms is just one more example, at the spatial level, of the social disaggregation they generate, in addition to that already seen in the realm of relations between individuals. In other words, delivery riders’ neglect of social norms governing behavior in public space is an illustration of the new circumstances imposed by the material conditions of work for digital platform firms. Whether taking a route that contravenes the highway code or neglects the provisions of a local transport plan in order to gain time, or the disorderly parking on roadway or sidewalk in front of dark stores, it is easy to understand that these activities, transacted in virtual space, generate new uses of public space that can result in conflict with local residents.

Gray zones, then, call for a multi-disciplinary approach: one can speak of a sociological gray zone, a legal gray zone, a political gray zone. The gray zone of the sociologists has given us the emergent figures described by such as Christian Azaïs, Donna Kesselman and Patrick Dieuaide, and the autoentrepreneurs—the self-employed as “entrepreneurs of the self”—who bring with them major changes in the organization of work, notably in terms of status and flexibility (Carelli et al. 2022). The law of labor and employment, indeed, offers an important window onto the impact of digital platforms, highlighted by recent developments in Europe (in late 2024) regarding the recognition of the rights of Uber drivers and the central importance of the relationship of subordination and the social protections that come with it. The concept of social labor relations proposed by D’Amours et al. (2023) registers the decline of the classical wage relation associated with the Fordist organization of production, which brings with it a new and different relationship to work.

The gray zone of the legal scholars, for its part, highlights the margin of appreciation, the room for maneuver available to the whole legal system, from lawyers to judges, in the interpretation and application of legislation. This is not a legal vacuum in the strict sense, but an area of discretionary power. Historically speaking, the idea of the gray zone emerged and developed against the background of three decades of the judicialization of society. The 1990s saw a new reliance on judicial process to settle disputes in many fields, this in some way replacing the political process in a further intensification of the malaise of modernity discussed by Charles Taylor (1991), who saw individualism overriding a common project of society, the social contract described by Rousseau taking second place to the quest for individual freedom, supposedly more emancipatory. Within such a framework, it is for the judge, rather than the legislator, to settle problems of social relations.

This is why the gray zone is also a matter of politics, as the subject not only of legislation but of the doctrine that informs judicial decision-making, which in France encompasses not only the principles derived from precedent but the entire corpus of writings, including academic writing, that supports interpretation of the law and to which a judge will turn in coming to a legal characterization of a situation—in the field of employment law, for example. Doctrine reflects the advance of ideas within society as a whole: to assert the existence of “digital subordination” in the context of work is to recognize the issues involved and their impact on the world of work. To ignore it is similarly consequential. Considered in this light, it clearly represents a social issue, and is, as such, subject to political choice.

Within this interdisciplinary entanglement, Henri Lefebvre’s idea of the right to the city proves of assistance (Lefebvre, 1968). The manifestation of the gray zone in urban space returns us, in fact, to the conflict over use and control so important to Lefebvre, which proves to be surprisingly relevant to current developments. In terms of his triad of perceived space, conceived space and lived space, the gray zone finds expression in a conflict between the use of space as conceived and as it is perceived by different social groups.

Lefebvre’s “triplicity of space” helps account for a number of different kinds of conflict associated with the gray zone. Between the conceived space of national and local planners, the perceived space of residents and the lived space of daily use and enjoyment as shaped in part by digital platforms and/or the delivery workers who serve them, we are faced with an intermingling of uses as contradictory in their material effects (in terms of the occupation of space) as they are opposed as social practices and in their ideological representation.

Mediating between the space of economic activity and the space of domestic life and the living environment more generally, urban space becomes a zone of strategic importance as the locus of last-mile logistics. The “last mile” represents the final link in the chain that sees a good or service delivered to the customer, that is, the last stage of the product’s journey. In the context of the dark stores we are concerned with here, this is evidently the domain of the delivery workers. The idea helps locate them in the chains of value and supply: to speak of the last mile is equally to invoke the first and all the rest. In the conflict of use discussed above, then, it is not the bicycle delivery rider but the whole value chain that local inhabitants are faced with, the rider being no more than its visible manifestation. The degree of conflict varies with the social character of the neighborhood and so the toleration accorded to these newcomers to the street scene, and to what extent their presence is regulated at neighborhood, city or even national level. It can sometimes certainly lead to pressure on elected representatives to introduce new curbs.

The endeavor to appropriate space is precisely what underlies the conflict of use between public authorities, local inhabitants and platform firms, and it is itself a manifestation of the gray zone in its blurring of boundaries, of categorial distinctions. A reminder, here, that the word “zone” primarily denotes geographical space or an area of land distinguished from its surroundings by its character or use.

In a way, the siting of dark stores and of the material activities of digital platforms more generally also poses the question of the Lefebvrian right to the city in its circumvention of the established rules: in the French case under consideration here, those governing the use of ground-floor commercial premises. Today, the living environment becomes, in a way, an issue of the right to the city, just as centrality was in Lefebvre’s day, as the presence of dark stores—welcome to some consumers, but unwelcome to other residents—disrupts established patterns of use and enjoyment. The volume of inflows and outflows, with incoming lorries on the one hand and last-mile delivery riders on the other, also raises issues of night-time disturbance: making noise at one or two in the morning in streets where people live (which in France often also means shopping streets above the ground-floor level) is socially unacceptable and leads to conflict.

The question of the right to the city brings us back to the fragmentation of the industrial city that came with the rise of functionalist urban planning. It was within that context that the notion of the right to the city articulated a number of fundamental issues, among them the need for centrality. Lefebvre’s thesis rests on the idea of space as a social product; the space that digital platforms seek to produce is informed by a neoliberal conception of development (non‑)planning, one of whose intrinsic features is its challenge to the established social rules regulating the city. This is what is at stake in the material, spatial manifestation of the gray zone. The digital platform economy needs the private space of the firm, but it also needs the use of public infrastructure, meaning that its appropriation of part of the public domain, in the material form of the road or the street, represents an essential link in its value chain. An example will serve to illustrate the issue: a bar or catering establishment that temporarily occupies part of the public domain by setting tables and chairs on the sidewalk has in France to pay a fee to the local authority. But who in our case is to be charged for the temporary occupation of the public domain: the dark store or the delivery rider?

The idea of the right to the city thus promises much, both theoretically and methodologically, in any consideration of the gray zone’s manifestations in urban space, and also serves as a conceptual nexus for multidisciplinary reflection.

Turning now to the political, we see that platforms have been proactive in influencing the legislation intended to govern their activities. Revealed by a newspaper investigation, in an article entitled “Uber files” (Leloup 2022), the dealings between Uber and then French minister of the economy Emmanuel Macron in 2013–17 offer a perfect illustration. Lobbyists for the digital platforms became true participants in the formulation of the legislation. This tacit participation in government has existed since the advent of industrial society, developing with the expansion of law: whenever government has proposed the extension of social protection, or the legal regulation of business more generally, the lobbying of business interests has had a major impact on the legislative outcome.

The advent of an “uberization” that seeks to evade or do away with the legal provisions that secure the social protection of workers represents a new phase in the extension of neoliberalism. More generally, it might be said to challenge the social state and the advances it brought. However, the degree of development of gray zones in any particular country varies with the solidity of the state institutions inherited from a past of social struggle and the strength of resistance offered. In the end, the emergence of the digital platform economy is part of the ongoing story of neoliberalism’s attack on the social state, which in the digital domain also draws on an economic libertarianism.

As part of this challenge to the established model of social protection, the platforms are seeking to foster a new collective narrative in proposing, for example, a new “social relation to work”, on the basis of their being the representatives of a new world made possible by technical progress. The big question that needs to be addressed, then, is whether the technical advances exploited by digital platforms are in fact likely to bring about the vaunted social progress.

Between the disengagement of government, the collapse of the Fordist model and the novel ambitions of business, a new social relation to work is indeed emerging, raising questions about how exactly the new social model is being set in place. What is the role of the digital platforms in the relationship of forces now emerging? While there is no one answer, it is evidently a question that requires transdisciplinary study, calling on legal, economic, sociological, political and, of course, geographical scholarship.

It is here that the spatial aspect takes on all its importance, for the production of urban space is a matter of politics above all, as the material expression of collective narrative and ideological choice. The organization of space, and of urban space in particular, is directly impacted by the new narrative promoted by the digital platforms, which are seeking, in the process, to free themselves of the social obligations of the past. The interaction between the mode of organization of work represented by the digital platforms and the novel uses of urban space connected with it is central to their conflicts with residents and public authorities—conflicts that derive, in the end, from a transformation in modes of consumption that brings with it a need for city-center sites. In this respect, dark stores are emblematic of the tensions generated by digital platforms at the heart of the city.

The Dark Stores: A Textbook Example of the Gray Zone?

The dark store sector exemplifies both the rapid growth of the digital platform economy and a materialization of the gray zone in its tendency to disrupt pre-existing regulation. Taking up David Harvey’s theorization of social relations in space and the questions regarding the urban it raises, Nicolas Lebrun notes a change in the mode of centrality of retail spaces that reflects an optimization of geographical proximity.

Adopting the conceptual approach developed by David Harvey (1987), “one may see in this a ‘liberalization’ of retail and commercial planning policy, the spatial aspect of the shift from a standardized to a flexible regime of accumulation that has led to the transformation of the Fordist city. For Harvey, flexibility’s impact on the urban is limited to the effects of structural changes in the labor market. But in the matter of retail [commerce], flexibility is not at all confined to changes in conditions of employment: the form and implantation of retail premises has been equally transformed by a flexibility evident as early as the 1970s” (Lebrun, 2023). 

Here, the essential thing is the connection between the urban centrality that attracts economic activity—thanks to the consumer density that enables the maximization of profits—and the establishment of rules governing the use of urban space and of the built environment in general and of retail premises in particular, such as, for example, rules of hygiene, but also those governing work. The creation of an uberized workforce impacts conditions of work as well as the use of public space.

When one thinks of the platform economy, it is Uber that comes immediately to mind. Its organizational model has given us the term uberization to join Taylorism and Fordism as forms of the organization of work that reshaped entire societies. All have had their effects on the geographical space within which they were deployed. In October 1913, Ford created a new mode of industrial production with the establishment of an assembly line at his Highpark plant in Detroit. A key factor in the ensuing flourishing of the city, this also marked the advent of a new age in the matter of productivity. This example well illustrates the strong connection between the mode of organization adopted and promoted by business and the life of the city, most notably when geographical space becomes industrial wasteland . . .

The consequences of uberization are many, and are not in the least immaterial: for while the customer places an order on-line, the logistical chain from the ultimate source of supply to the last mile and the final destination is very much material. The new modes of production are reflected in a new form of trade. In the case of the dark stores, one notes how the new mass availability of home delivery has seen the appearance of a new category of bicycle-mounted logistics workers who swarm across the city in quest of pick-ups and final destinations.

In setting the dark stores in the history of the urban, Pascal Madry identifies a number of phases in the growth of modern retail, marked successively by the Industrial Revolution, the opening of the first hypermarkets in the 1960s, and the electronification of retail in the late 1990s (Madry 2016). They are characterized by the progressive separation of the three flows: the flow of information between seller and buyer, first effected by word of mouth; the flow of money when payment is made; and the flow of goods when purchases are handed over. All three are essential to any commercial transaction. The eventual spatial separation of production, storage and sale changed the relationship between shopping and the city on the one hand and between seller and buyer on the other. Their former unity has given way to dematerialized transactions and the spatial dispersion of three now distinct functions (Schirrer et al. 2024).

The way this is exemplified in the abortive development of dark stores in France is instructive in more than one respect. They represented “a model of retail that was already in the throes of change before the Covid crisis . . . quick commerce ran into problems associated with the disorderly character of its implantation in the urban fabric. Investors, in fact, were following a strategy known as ‘blitzscaling’, engaging in a dash for growth to gain advantage over their competitors. The idea being to get to be the biggest and carry all before you” (Schorung et al. 2022).

This account highlights the very rapid proliferation of the dark stores whose business model relied more on gaining a physical presence in city centers than on short-term financial profitability. It also called for a post-Fordist workforce and equally the destabilization of planning rules to enable the (mis)use of ground-floor retail premises.

The idea of the gray zone is fruitful, here, in drawing attention to two dynamics. The first is economic, involving the implantation of a novel economic activity in the city and its impact on urban space. The second involves the political response and the reaction of the public authorities to the emergence and growth of an activity undesired and perhaps undesirable. It is here that the idea of the gray zone demonstrates its utility, whether sociological, in fostering such notions as emergent figures or the relation of digital subordination, or geographical, in the blurring of use classes involved in the utilization of ground-floor premises not for traditional retail or commercial uses but for storage—not only contravening the law on change of use but also bringing about a change of use of public space, with the arrival en masse of bicycle delivery riders who park themselves in front of the premises while waiting to pick up a consignment.

Having their entire floor area devoted to storage, dark stores are to be treated as warehouses. Local Development Plans (LDPs) define as shops premises where no more than one third of the total floor area is devoted to storage. In the case of Paris, the LDP bans warehouses in residential areas. Change of use, as here, from shop to warehouse, is only possible through making a declaration under Article R.421-17 of the Planning Code. Dark stores on average stock some 1,500 to 2,000 lines, these being the products in greatest demand, as compared to the 15,000 to 20,000 lines available via car-free pickup from such [supermarkets] as Carrefour. These establishments, located in city centers, do not receive shoppers on their premises, being exclusively devoted to on-line orders via a mobile application. The character of dark stores and their classification as shop or warehouse was the subject of a legal battle much broader in its implications than a simple question of land use. (Schirrer et al, 2024).

Furthermore:

A breakdown of delivery riders’ activity during the 15 minutes laid down by the delivery contract reveals that travel time, paradoxically, represents only 50% of total delivery time.^[4] Delivery riders thus spend half the time allocated to the job waiting in public space, chiefly concentrated around collection points, before then adding to the density of cycle traffic on the public roads and making a multitude of short-term stops near the points of delivery (Schirrer et al, 2024).

Conclusion

Geographical space thus proves to be central to the analysis of uberization as the material ground of the transformations involved. In generating new forms of mobility of both people and goods, these new business sectors impact urban space in many different ways. By way of conclusion, and invitation to further work, one can say that the idea of the gray zone offers insights into a new phase of the relation between capital, labor and geographical space. The development of the digital platforms raises questions not only about workers’ rights to social protection but also about urban planning. The Conseil d’État’s decision in March 2023^[5] to create a new (sub-)category in order to locate the dark store in the framework of planning law demonstrates the difficulty of grasping a phenomenon in the absence of an adequate conceptual framework. It is good to name things, but to categorize them is even better!

Manifestation of a globalization that has manifold local impacts, the world-spanning pure players of the digital call for a regulatory response on the part of the public authorities. A political response is needed and the economic transformation under way will entail adjustments involving every aspect of society. In this, the society-wide impacts and implications of digital platform activity raise questions about individualism for consumers and residents, and about the relationship to the collective for society as a whole. The space inhabited by post-Fordist workers is itself a manifestation of the gray zone: from the centrality of these productive activities to their impact on residents’ living environment and to the periphery as the home of the post-Fordist workers (Aguiléra et al. 2018).

Geographical space needs to be given a more important place in the analysis of gray zones if one is to grasp the diverse configurations under study not only in terms of labor law but in terms of the spatial categories that help account for the conditions of life of the populations of precarious workers associated with them. This represents a whole new topic for social geography. Furthermore, while dark stores are no longer proliferating in France, thanks to legislation, they are doing very well in many other countries. There is, then, no standard model, and the logic of their geographical implantation varies from one country to another—a situation that suits the digital platforms very well.

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