Roberto J. Walton^[2]

Abstract

Husserl stresses the transcendental impulse inherent to Protagoras’ consideration of subjective functions and of the world as a possible object for them. But Heidegger states that nothing in the view of human beings as a measure entails that the subject is the court that judges all beings and their Being. It is not a matter of taking decisions on the objectivity of objects by a subject, but of a limitation of measuring to the realm of unconcealment, so that, on the other hand, disclosure always maintains a relationship with concealment. This limitation entails a restriction which contrasts with the lack of limits for subjectivity in Modern philosophy. Thus, Heidegger attempts to think phenomenology according to its belongingness to Western philosophy and, in this inquiry, he considers that the manifestation of phenomena in acts of consciousness is viewed in “a still more originary manner” in Greek thought as “the unconcealment of what is present” (GA 14: 99). Nevertheless, the intertwining of concealment and unconcealment in a reciprocal limitation of closure and disclosure is essential to Husserl’s analysis of horizonality. Heidegger’s illustration of the fundamental characteristics of the coming-to-presence is significant not only because it allows a reference to Husserl’s analyses, but also because these descriptions show that the implication of a subject to which both things and context appear or come-to-presence is inseparable from the situation. The distinction between thematic and nonthematic patency requires beforehand a subject turning attention toward the theme, the contrast between patency and latency presupposes a subject perceiving thematic and nonthematic patency, and the differentiation between familiar latency and unfamiliar latency implies as a preceding condition a subject endowed with a typical possession of the world.

   

Key words: Husserl; Heidegger; presence; horizonality; unconcealment.

Resumen

Husserl subraya el impulso trascendental inherente a las consideraciones de Protágoras sobre las funciones subjetivas y el mundo como un objeto posible para ellas. Pero Heidegger sostiene que nada en la visión del ser humano como una medida implica que el sujeto sea la corte que juzga todos los entes y el ser. No se trata de tomar decisiones sobre la objetividad de los objetos por un sujeto, sino de una limitación de la medida al ámbito de condición de no oculto, de modo que, por otro lado, la desocultación siempre mantiene una relación con la condición de oculto. Esta limitación implica una restricción que contrasta con la falta de límites para la subjetividad en la filosofía moderna. Así, Heidegger procura pensar la fenomenología de acuerdo con su pertenencia a la filosofía de Occidente y, en esta investigación, considera que la manifestación de fenómenos en actos de conciencia es contemplada de “una manera incluso más originaria” en el pensamiento griego como “la desocultación de lo presente” (GA 14: 99). Sin embargo, el entrelazamiento de la condición de oculto y la condición de no oculto en una recíproca limitación de desocultación y ocultación es esencial al análisis de Husserl sobre la horizonticidad. La ilustración heideggeriana de las características fundamentales del venir a la presencia de lo presente es significativa no solamente porque permite una referencia a los análisis de Husserl, sino también porque estas descripciones muestran que la implicación de un sujeto al cual las cosas y su contexto aparecen o vienen a la presencia es inseparable de la situación. La distinción entre patencia temática y no temática requiere de antemano un sujeto que dirija su atención al tema, el contraste entre latencia y patencia presupone un sujeto que percibe la patencia temática o no temática, y la diferenciación entre latencia familiar y latencia no familiar entraña como condición precedente un sujeto dotado de una posesión típica del mundo.

   

Palabras clave: Husserl; Heidegger; presencia; horizonticidad; desocultación.

§ 1. Coming-to-presence. Its fundamental characteristics

Heidegger attempts to think phenomenology according to its belongingness to Western philosophy and, in this inquiry, he considers that the manifestation of phenomena in acts of consciousness is viewed in “a still more originary manner” in Greek thought as “the unconcealment of what is present” (GA 14: 99).^[3] Nevertheless, his examination of the coming-to-presence of what is present (das Anwesen des Anwesenden), i.e., the Being of beings, allows many references to Husserl’s analyses and a reinstatement of acts of consciousness.

According to Heidegger, Being revealed itself in the dawn of Western thought as “the appearing that shines” (das scheinende Erscheinen) (GA 40: 108), as “the coming-to-presence of what is present” (GA 8). Heidegger asserts: “Appearing <das Erscheinen> is the fundamental characteristic <Grundzug> of the coming-to-presence of the present insofar as it emerges toward disclosing <Entbergung>” (GA 12: 125). In What Signifies Thinking?, he enumerates the “fundamental characteristics of the coming-to-presence of what is present” (GA 8: 241 [239]) by mentioning, among other features, unconcealment (Unverborgenheit), rising from unconcealment (das Aufgehen aus ihr), entry into unconcealment (das Eingehen zu ihr), the coming hereby and the going away (das Herbei- und das Hinweg), and the hidden suddenness of an ever-possible absenting into concealment (die verborgene Jähe des möglichen Abwesens in die Verborgenheit).

Heidegger’s example is that of mountains as they lie before us and are examined only as regards to their coming-to-presence:

Having risen out of unconcealment, what is present also has entered into what was already unconcealed: the mountain lies in the landscape. Its coming-to-presence is the rising entry into the unconcealed within unconcealment (aufgehendes Eingehen in das Unverborgene innerhalb der Unverborgenheit), […] (GA 8: 240 [236]).

All this occurs as a coming forth, and the reverse is presented as the going away and absenting into concealment in a “gathering together” of rising and absenting. These characteristics, which have a bearing on the mobility of coming-to-presence and its reverse, have particular interest for the disclosure of similarities with Husserl’s analysis of horizonality, which in turn helps to work out an explanation of the intended meanings of “rising from unconcealment” and “entry into unconcealment.”

Husserl’s analysis distinguishes a patent world and a latent world, and, within patency, between a thematic and a nonthematic world. Thematic patency characterizes the mountain to which attention is turned, and nonthematic patency the rest of the mountain chain perceived in the background. That part of the chain that cannot be perceived is latent, and this latency splits into a horizon of acquaintedness and a horizon of unacquaintedness depending on our previous experiences. According to this articulation of horizonality, unconcealment is centered upon what is thematically patent and its scope varies according to whether it encompasses only nonthematic patency or extends also to familiar latency.

These distinctions help to make clear some of Heidegger’s fundamental characteristics: (i) the unconcealed within unconcealment can be equated with thematic patency (the mountain); (ii) absenting into concealment with sinking into latency; (iii) rising from unconcealment with emerging from nonthematic patency (the mountain chain in the background), and (iv) entering into unconcealment with coming into thematic patency. This would explain the intended meanings of both “rising out of” and “entering into” unconcealment. The mountain can rise out of nonthematic patency and enter into thematic patency in a transition within a narrow sense of unconcealment or rise out of familiar latency into patency within a wide sense of unconcealment.^[4]

Heidegger’s illustration of the coming-to-presence of what is present through the appearing of mountains within a landscape is significant not only because it allows this reference to Husserl’s analyses, but also because these descriptions show that the implication of a subject to which the mountain and the landscape appear or come-to-presence is inherent to the situation. The distinction between the unconcealed within unconcealment and unconcealment as such—thematic patency and nonthematic patency—requires beforehand a subject turning attention toward the theme. The contrast between unconcealment and concealment—patency and latency—presupposes a subject perceiving thematic and nonthematic patency, and the differentiation between acquaintedness and concealment implies as preceding condition a subject endowed with a typical possession of the world. In sum: attention, perception, and habituality are essential to the distinctions and imply a subject.

There is an additional element that concerns the mediation between concealment and unconcealment. The overlapping of descriptions extends to encompass a parallel between Heidegger’s clearing (Lichtung) and Husserl’s world-representation.

Clearing is an open domain which, as a space free from trees and underbrush in a forest, renders possible the coming-to-presence of beings and Dasein’s comportment with them. It is identified with a world: “The ‘world’ is the clearing of Being […]” (GA 9: 350). It encompasses as an openness all beings and “is, if considered from the standpoint of beings, more being than beings <seiender als das Seiende>” (GA 5: 40).^[5] It is, so to say, an intermediate dimension between manifest beings and the concealment of Being.

For Husserl, a world-representation is a “project” that renders possible an “objectivation, identification, recognition” of the world beyond its condition of a universal indeterminate horizon for our experiences. It is an “acquired possession” (erworbener Besitz), and this means that it is built out of the typicality of the world that makes up the horizon of acquaintedness: “If I hadn’t built it,” Husserl says, “I would know nothing about the world” (Hua XXXIX: 76, 78). As a clearing, a world-representation mediates the relationship between the horizon of unacquaintedness and both things and subjectivity.

§ 2. Coming-to-presence and truth

Heidegger stresses the link between coming-to-presence and unconcealment: “Coming-to-presence only occurs when unconcealment already prevails” (GA 7: 142). The unconcealment of what is present is tied, according to Heidegger, to the beginning of a history of truth in which its most important modes are, along with unconcealment in early Greek thought, adequation in Plato and Aristotle, certainty in Descartes, objectivity in Kant, and the subsequent securing of existing stocks (Bestandsicherung) in the era of technology (GA 5: 240; GA 7: 85). Husserl provides us with a view of truth in which unconcealment, adequation, certainty, objectivity, and securing of stocks converge in a unified description, with no distortion or deviation (Entwindung) demanding a recovery (Einwindung).

An object emerging from a background serves as an example of unconcealment. As stated in the Sixth Logical Investigation, truth is “an identity: the full agreement of what is meant and what is given as such” (Hua XIX/2: 651 [263 ff.]). This agreement between a meaningful intention and fulfillment is already displayed in the level of intuition itself. Insofar as the object shows itself in adumbrations, and the adequation of these profiles is inherent to its manifestation, the traditional notion of adequation is grounded in the given object. Each appearance sets up empty intentions that can confirm or undeceive, and truth is “the object given in the manner of the object meant […]” (Hua XIX/2: 652 [264]). Husserl states that “the verifying evidence is nothing other than the consciousness of the adaequatio rei et intellectus carried out in the originality of possessing the self <Ursprünglichkeit der Selbsthabe>” (Hua XI: 102 [147]). This originary adequation is presupposed by all other modes of adequation such as “the rightness of our intention (and especially that of our judgment)” (Hua XIX/2: 653 [264]).

Certainty is the manner of believing in which the subject is conscious of the actuality of the object as the correlative mode of being, legitimated by the adequation of its adumbrations. Objectivity is for Husserl the necessary presupposition for the establishment of a foothold in the midst of changing horizons that in turn shields the integrity of what is objectified. Abiding by the object is the function of horizonality and its indeterminateness. There always remains an empty horizon with a plus ultra because progressive fulfilling is at once a progressive emptying. The possibility of unfolding horizons over and over again hinders total unconcealment. As Husserl says, things are “not completely known <nicht völlig bekannt>” (Hua XIII: 10).

Finally, in the search for a parallel to the notion of “securing of existing stocks,” we must resort to genetic phenomenology in order to find it, without the Heideggerian negative connotations, in the Husserlian notion of a “storeroom” (Vorratskammer) (Hua IX: 434), i.e., a chamber of supplies or assured resources that makes up the realm of acquaintedness within the horizon of latency.

Thus, unconcealment, adequation, certainty, objectivity, and securing of existent stocks appear as pertaining to the experience of an object.

§ 3. Coming-to-presence and horizonality

According to Heidegger, in the first of the Country Path Conversations, horizon-forming is a “setting before” (Vor-stellen) and a “setting toward” (Zustellen) of the objectness of objects, for example, the jugness of the jug. This is the outward-view (Aussicht) in which things stand out against us with the outward-look (Aussehen) of a jug. In other words, the outward-look of the objects comes to our encounter on the basis of the outer-view delimited by a horizon. Thus, horizonality is described as entailing “an open circle-of-vision <ein offener Gesichtskreis>” (GA 77: 83 [54]). However, this openness is not self-sustaining because it refers back to “an open that surrounds us <ein uns umgebende Offenes>” of which the horizon is “the side turned to us” (GA 77: 112 [72]). Heidegger speaks of the “originary region <ursprüngliche Gegend>” (GA 55: 371) or “the region of all regions <die Gegend aller Gegenden>” which gathers everything and must be characterized in itself and not in terms of its being turned toward our setting-before: “The open-region,” he writes, “surrounds us and shows itself to us as the horizon” (GA 77: 121 [78]).

On Heidegger’s account, a limitless horizon makes no sense because there must be a closure to the unfolding of horizons. A horizon could not be “what delimits <das Umgrenzende>” the jugness of a jug if it lacked limits. The key lines to consider are these:

Since each horizon is referred on to a further horizon, the horizon as such would remain without limit. But then how is the horizon supposed to be what its own name says? How is it supposed to be what delimits if it essentially lacks limits? A limitless horizon is like a crooked straight line (GA 77: 94 [60]).

The decisive point is that Heidegger identifies horizonality with determination and limitation.^[6] Hence, openness cannot be explained in terms of horizons and there must be a region beyond that sustains them leaving no further chances for horizonality. In contrast to this, for Husserl, the world is the universal horizon to which we have access through the unfolding of horizons in a process without limits in which each particular horizon points beyond to a more encompassing horizon. Within each particular horizon there is indeterminateness besides a determinate structure. Indeterminateness both pervades horizons of anticipation and goes beyond them into the marginal undetermined world as a universal horizon. If horizonality is conceived both as open determinateness and determinate openness, the contrast established by Heidegger between the surrounding and encircling of horizonality and the open expanse of the original region vanishes. Horizonality does not derive its openness from another source but is original and essential to what gives support to particular horizons on the same level in which these are placed. Thus, the contrast between transcendental anticipation and what is originary is undermined by showing openness in the horizon of anticipation and thus a connection with the world-horizon. A clear-cut distinction between transcendental horizonality and an original dimension from which the circle-of-vision would derive is not justified.

§ 4. Coming-to-presence and transcendental subjectivity

Husserl refers to the “transcendental impulse” (Hua VII: 60 passim [62 passim]) inherent to Protagoras’ consideration of the subjective functions and of the world as a possible object for them. But Heidegger states that nothing in the view of human beings as a measure entails that the subject is the court that judges and takes decisions on the objectivity of objects. Rather, it entails a limitation (Beschränkung) of measuring to the realm of unconcealment, so that, on the other hand, disclosure always maintains a relationship with concealment. This restriction (Einschränkung) contrasts with the lack of limits (Entschränkung) for subjectivity in Modern philosophy (GA 6.2: 138). Nevertheless, as we have seen, the intertwining of concealment and unconcealment in a reciprocal limitation of closure and disclosure is essential to Husserl’s analysis of horizonality. In Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger speaks of “the swinging of the turning <die Schwingung der Kehre>” (GA 65: 380 [265]) between the call of Being and belongingness of Dasein, and refers to “the essential difference from every merely transcendental way of knowing with regard to the conditions of possibility” because “Da-sein does not accomplish anything unless it be to get hold of the counter-swinging of appropriating, that is, to shift into this counter-swinging and thus first of all become itself: the preserver of the thrown project, the grounded founder of the ground <der gegründete Gründer des Grundes>” (GA 65: 239 [169]). Thus, the transcendental pathway previous to the turning has been “only provisional, in order to prepare the reversing momentum” (GA 65: 239 [169]). Heidegger characterizes thinking as the letting-lie-before-us and taking-to-heart (Vorliegen lassen und in der Acht nehmen) of the coming-to-presence of the present, i.e., beings in their Being. This reflects his reading of the close kinship of νοεῖν and λέγειν in early Greek thought. Νοεῖν signifies vernehmen, perceiving or apprehending, and Vernehmen amounts to “letting something come to one, whereby not only is it simply received <hingenommen> but also a position of reception <Aufnahmestellung> is established facing what shows itself” (GA 40: 146). Heidegger resorts to a comparison with a reception or defense position established by troops that want to meet the enemy at least with the purpose of bringing them to a standstill: “This receiving what appears and bringing it to a halt,” he writes, “is implied in νοεῖν <Dieses aufnehmende Zum-stehen-bringen des Erscheinenden liegt im νοεῖν>” (GA 40: 147). In spite of Heidegger’s claim to withdraw the transcendental stance after the Kehre, this attitude comes forth in the analysis of thinking as in its relation with the coming-to-presence of the present. It can be inferred that Dasein, as the grounded guardian of the ground, rather than not accomplishing anything, offers a position of assimilation in order to take up what is given through a transcendental structure linked to the fundamental characteristics of coming-to-presence. There is a defense position that requires a subject that pays attention, perceives, acquires a sedimentation, and hence accomplishes an articulation of what is given.

Furthermore, in What Signifies Thinking?, as he reasserts that νοεῖν is not the mere passive receiving (Hinnehmen) of something, Heidegger writes:

The νοεῖν perceives <ver-nimmt> beforehand by taking to mind and heart <so, dass es in die Acht nimmt>. The heart <Acht> is the wardship <Wacht> guarding what lies before us, though this wardship itself needs the guarding <Verwahrung> which is accomplished in the λέγειν as gathering <Versammeln> (GA 8: 210 [207]).

Heidegger adds that perceiving (Vernehmen) amounts to undertaking something (Vor-nehmen), so that, as it regards what is perceived “we take it up specifically, and do something with it <mit ihm etwas anfangen>” (GA 8: 205 [203 ff.]). Undertaking something, taking to heart in the sense of considering seriously and guarding are reflected in the imposing of modes of setting (Stellen) as an a priori to what appears. These modes develop in the counter-swinging between Being and Dasein from “the setting-by from itself <das von sich aus Beistellen>” pertaining to φύσις to the “degrading and ordering encompassing-setting <nachstellend-bestellendes Gestell>” (GA 79: 63 ff.) that characterizes our times.

§ 5. The unapparent

A very brief final mention to the additional parallel can be worked out regarding the movement back to an absolute ultimate on which no further light can be shed, i.e., to what cannot come to presence. Both Husserl’s living present and Heidegger’s Ereignis, the enowning event, are an outstanding example of what does not appear and come to the forefront in a similar twofold procedure.

On the one hand, the reduction from objects conceived as transcendental clues to possible modes of consciousness is followed by a radical reduction from the stream of consciousness to the living present as the condition of possibility for its temporal flow. On the other hand, the “leap” or “spring” (Sprung) which takes place from beings to Being considered as a ground (Grund) is followed by a leap from Being to the abyss (Abgrund) which is not a ground and is named “event” to distinguish it from mere occurrences allowing a further explanation. According to Husserl, the living present is “the ‘primal phenomenon’ <Urphänomen> to which all the transcendental regressive inquiry leads back <zurückgeht> in the method of the phenomenological reduction” (Hua Mat VIII: 6). With reference to the event, Heidegger writes: “There is nothing else <nichts anderes> to which the event still leads back <zurückführt>, by which it could be explained” (GA 12: 247). As the living present is “unexperienceable and unspeakable <unerfahrbar und unsagbar>” (Hua Mat VIII: 269), the Ereignis remains “undetermined and enigmatic” in “concealment and withdrawal <Verbergung und Entzug>” (GA 14: 22, 50; GA 12: 241 ff.). We see that, however different their views may be, the coming-to-presence of phenomena imposes significant convergences on the descriptions of both thinkers. Nevertheless, the differences are significant. First, the implication of a subject is inherent to the characterization of the coming-to-present of the present. Secondly, fundamental moments in the development of truth from early Greek thought onwards can be encompassed in a unified view of truth. Thirdly, Heidegger’s objections to horizonality as a derived formation can be overcome if we dwell on its indeterminateness. Finally, the transcendental condition of subjectivity persists even in the attempt to set it aside. Maybe I have not adequately substantiated Husserl’s supreme authority, but I think Lester would have been pleased with this attempt.

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