Luis Flores Hernández^[2]

Abstract

Husserl recognizes empirical and exact sciences. He notes that both sciences require clarification (Klärung), hence they are dogmatic. Nevertheless, he contrasts both these sciences to radical science, which is based on the method of phenomenological clarification. For Husserl, dogmatic sciences are characterized by the use of an essentially symbolic methodology, by being factories (Fabriken) of extremely valuable propositions, and by the presence of specialists (Fachmänner) that are engineers in the art of science who do not surpass the “technical rationality” and techniques of thought (Denktechniken), and thereby constitute a scientific culture produced by the mixture of insight (Einsicht) and instinct. On the other hand, insofar as the dogmatic sciences deal with three types of concepts—formal-logical, regional and particular—, the clarification of those concepts gives rise to the latissimo sensu ontologies in whose universe all essences would be possible. Yet the ideal of clarification entails the foundation of these essences from purely intuitive sources. However, said ideal requires the conceptual discernment between making distinct (Verdeutlichung) and making clear. This is because distinction deploys itself in the sphere of simple thought, has a propaedeutic function, and is concerned with the logical analysis of sense, whereas clarification is concerned with intuition.

   

Key words: phenomenological clarification; sciences; radical science.

Resumen

Husserl distingue entre ciencias empíricas y exactas. Observa que ambas ciencias requieren de clarificación (Klärung); por ello, son dogmáticas. No obstante, contrapone a ambas la ciencia radical, basada en el método de la clarificación fenomenológica. Para Husserl, dichas ciencias se caracterizan por el empleo de una metodología esencialmente simbólica, por ser fábricas (Fabriken) de proposiciones muy valiosas y por la presencia de especialistas (Fachmänner) que son ingenieros del arte de la ciencia y que no superan la “racionalidad técnica” ni las técnicas de pensamiento (Denktechniken), constituyendo así una cultura científica producida por la mezcla de intelección (Einsicht) e instinto. Por otra parte, en la medida que las ciencias dogmáticas suponen conceptos de tres tipos –lógico-formales, regionales y particulares–, el esclarecimiento de estos da lugar a las ontologías latissimo sensu, en cuyo universo serían posibles todas las esencias. Pero el ideal de la clarificación supone la fundamentación de estas a partir de fuentes puramente intuitivas. Sin embargo, dicho ideal requiere discernir conceptualmente entre distinción (Verdeutlichung) y clarificación. Esto porque la primera se despliega en la esfera del simple pensamiento, tiene una función propedéutica y concierne al análisis lógico del sentido. En cambio, la segunda concierne a la intuición.

   

Palabras clave: clarificación fenomenológica; ciencias; ciencia radical.

§ 1. Essences and sciences

For Husserl, first, there is no chaos, but rather cosmos: “[…] since the real actuality is no chaos but rather a regionally ordered whole” (Hua V: 27 [24]).^[3] The alveoli of these regions are the essences, and these are thematized by the concepts of genus and species. Essences comprise a broad variety, from the lowest essences up to the essences of higher universalities (Hua V: 41 [36]). The basic original classification (Klassifikation) does not depend on us, but is prescribed by the essences themselves. There are pure and simple essences (the harmonious ones). Beyond these, we find the non-harmonious essences; namely, the non-essences (Unwesen) (Hua V: 87 [75]).

Sciences try to conceptualize such regions following their own nature. What is a science for Husserl? “A science: that means an infinity of systematically connected truths explorable in systematic unity and naturally truths that do not lie at hand but rather are discovered only as fruits of arduous investigation” (Hua V: 43 [37]). This definition is an echo of the Kantian architectonic of pure reason. Kant holds: “by an architectonic I understand the art of systems” (2009: B 860). He adds: “Since systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the doctrine of that which is scientific in our cognition in general” (Kant 2009: B 860). This arquitectonic holds at bay to rhapsody (for instance of sensations), which as a concept is akin to the concept of chaos in Husserl. Kant follows on: “Under the government of reason our cognition cannot at all constitute a rhapsody but must constitute a system, in which alone they can support and advance its essential ends. I understand by a system, however, the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea” (2009: B 860). To sum up, science is possible because the articulatio is superior to the coacervatio (Kant 2009: B 861).

Now then, sciences are connected with the order of the actual reality in two ways: as empirical sciences and as eidetic sciences. The former investigates the existence (Dasein); the latter, the essence. Nevertheless, “eidetic science everywhere precedes experiential science” (Hua V: 42 [37]). Both types of sciences generate truths: empirical and eidetic ones. And these are extremely outstanding for Husserl: “The eidetic truths are valid and are valid in unconditional universality and necessity for everything possible as well as for everything authentically itself as actual <wirkliche> in actually occurring experience” (Hua V: 42 [ 37]). Husserl echoes the Leibnizian distinction between vérités de fait and vérités de raison. This one was retrieved by Kant with the distinction between quaestio facti and quaestio juri.

That said, empirical theoretical science does not presuppose an eidetic one. It is so that surveying existed before geometry, astronomy before mathematical mechanics, and psychology—with its variant of experimental modern psychology—before eidetic psychology. Nevertheless, the constitution of an eidetic science must mean “a decisive step forward by the corresponding experiential science” (Hua V: 43 [37]). From the methodological point of view, and in accordance with the eidetic attitude, the process is as follows: “Carrying out eidetic focusing, we now proceed to the pure sense; we abstract from the existential positing of the actually occurring experience” (Hua V: 29 [26]).^[4] In the case of the researcher of nature, Husserl emphasizes two very contemporary features, also noted by authors like Ch. S. Peirce and T. S. Kuhn: “In the cognition of nature the investigator is naturally there with body and soul, and not only the individual investigator of nature, but also the community <Gemeinschaft> of investigators to which each individual knows that he belongs” (Hua V: 2 [2]). That is to say, it is not a question of abstract and isolated onlookers, but of an embodied community.

Of the sciences as a whole, Husserl highlights the contraposition of descriptive and explicative (erklärender) sciences. If it is a matter of a science of the real (Realen), Husserl specifies: “All science of the real is causally explanatory if it actually and in the sense of Objective validity wants to determine what the real is” (Hua V: 4 [3]). It is so that “scientific investigation demands an ever renewed penetration into the real-causal connections” (Hua V: 5 [4]). Then it is a question of the prevailing role of causality in the sciences of reality (Realität).

Where to track the essence “and therewith the possible goals and methods (in fundamental universality)”? (Hua V: 13 [11]). Not certainly with specialists and their dogmatic sciences, concerned with methodological technique (Hua V: 13 [11]). It is the affair of the philosopher: “the fundamental essence, the idea of every science of a categorical type and the idea of its method as the ‘sense’ of every science” (Hua V: 13 [Ideas III: 11]). All this precedes the very science and the fundamental essence: “can—and must—be established from the proper essence of the idea of its objectivity, which determines its dogma, that is to say, can be established apriori” (Hua V: 13 [11]).

If it is a matter of a phenomenological investigation of essences, then “it prescribes limits <Grenzen> for psycho-physical investigations that are just as absolutely fixed as those which geometry prescribes for geodetic investigations” (Hua V: 18 [16]). Kant had already made a distinction between a priori (Grenzen) and factual (Schranken) limits:

But experience teaches me this: that wherever I go, I always see a space around in which I could proceed further; thus I cognize the limits <Schranken> of my actual knowledge of the earth at any time, but not the boundaries <Grenzen> of all possible description of the earth (2009: B 787).

Another feature that crosses all sciences is interrelation. Some of them are independent—like natural science, physics, somatology (understood as the science of animate organicity [Leiblichkeit]) (Hua V: 8 [7]) and anthropology (“or zoology fully understood”) (Hua V: 19 [16])—, some others are dependent—like somatological aesthesiology—and others are relatively dependent—like physical somatology. The relations of foundation between them are at stake.

§ 2. Scientific and phenomenological methods

Where does the method of science arise from? Certainly, neither from the so-called modern science, nor from self-styled specialists. Husserl’s thesis is that “the essence of the objects and the appurtenant essence of possible experience of objects of the category concerned (that is the apriori of the phenomenological constitution) prescribes everything fundamental” (Hua V: 22 [20]). The correlation of essences is the source of the legitimacy of the method. The expert of genius grasps the a priori “Intuitively” (Hua V: 22 [20]). This a priori absolutely intransgressible, obtained from the phenomenological intuition (Intuition), fixes the frame of science’s game. It is so that the theme of general noetics, “which reaches out beyond all categories of objectivities and constitutive Intuitions,” is “what normatively determines method in general” (Hua V: 22 [20]). The method of all science is a function of “the sort of originally bestowing <gebender> intuition, or the basic sort of originary apprehension <Auffassung>” (Hua V: 22 [20]). To sum up, for Husserl, “it is clear that methodological norms that experience brings out of itself and that are obviously grounded in their essence must be determinative for the natural-scientific method” (Hua V: 22–23 [20]). What does a complete method in sciences presuppose? It “presupposes the systematic development of the ontology, i.e., the eidetic doctrine that belongs to this object-category involved” (Hua V: 23 [21]).

Husserl confronts scientific methods with the method of a radical science that demands radical rigor, and that crystallizes in the form of the phenomenological method. This one possesses sense and related norms (Normierungen) that guide phenomenological descriptions. Essential features of phenomenology are “that it be continually applied to itself reflectively, that out of phenomenological sources <Quellen> it must bring to fullest clarity the method itself which it practices” (Hua V: 93 [80]). The doctrine of reductions characterizes the phenomenological method and, among them, in this paper we especially focus on the reduction to greatest possible clarity. But this reduction is a particular case of the general method of clarification (Klärung), which is important to all scientific spheres. For that reason, radical rigor demands a clarification in a second degree, that is, a meta clarification: an illumination (Durchleutung) of the clarification (Klärung) (Hua V: 93 [80]). Then, the obvious demand is that all sciences be well grounded. Nevertheless, the conviction (Überzeugung) of the truth of a theory and its practically useful application differs from the ability to ground it, from having grounded insight into it.

Husserl faces the historical factum of birth in regard to theories and sciences, and he verifies that it does not presuppose the insight and its possibility. For that reason, sciences are called dogmatic, insofar as they are in need of clarification. Why do they have this need? Because “sciences are all far removed from a sufficient, perfect grounding in insight <einsichtigen>” (Hua V: 94 [81]). That is because concepts are incorporated into scientific research with a stock of confusion (Verworrenheit), without reaching the depth of clarity. For Husserl, a remarkable teleology prevails in human culture in general and also in scientific culture: “in that valuable results can arise without insight <Einsicht> or through a mixture of insight and instinct <Instinkt>” (Hua V: 94 [81]). This notion of science is reiterated in Die Krisis der europaïschen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: “Discovery is really a mixture of instinct and method” (Hua VI: 39 [40]).

What do the “methodics” of sciences consist of (Hua V: 95 [82])? Concepts are utilized symbolically, as counters with which one operates, applying an essentially symbolic method, typical of symbolic rationality: “The art of continually inventing <Die Kunst der Erfindung> new symbolic procedures […] presupposes, without insight, the cognitive value <Erkenntniswert> of the symbols” (Hua V: 95 [82]).^[5] What was “relatively a matter of insight on a lower level” is symbolized anew on a higher level and “robbed of evidentness <Einsichtigkeit> (as a superfluous burden of thought)” (Hua V: 95 [82]). This is the level zero of the Einsicht, where thought becomes fully blind, mechanical, obscure and confused. Husserl confirms here the contrast pointed out in the Logische Untersuchungen between original meanings and ludic meanings (Spielbedeutungen), whereby he echoes Leibniz’s Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, written in 1684. Positively, the Leibnizian ideal of knowledge is knowledge “at the same time adequate and intuitive,” which is “perfect in every respect” (Leibnitz 1908: 28). Negatively, Leibniz opposes this ideal to the following knowledge: “I am accustomed to call this thought blind or again symbolical; and we make use of it in algebra, in arithmetic and almost everywhere” (1908: 30).

Which is the sediment of such symbolic activity of sciences? Husserl paints a picture where one can, as a practical man “at best comprehend the technical rationality” (Hua V: 95 [82]).^[6] Sciences become “factories <Fabriken> turning out very valuable and practically useful propositions” (Hua V: 95 [82]). Scientists become laborers and inventive technicians. Experts are defined by Husserl as “the engineers of the art of science” (Hua V: 95 [82]), which possibly satisfies “technicians in the usual sense, whose goal is the practical control of reality” (Hua V: 95 [82]). Husserl’s cultural judgment is that, concerning the advances of science: “The world is not in the least more intelligible <verständlichen> because of them; it has only become more useful <nützlicher> for us” (Hua V: 96 [82]). There is no more “inner understanding <Verständnis>” (Hua V: 95 [82]). Then, reason is diagnosed as being in a precarious, impoverished state that must be overcome.

In his Krisis, Husserl denounces a lazy reason: “Is it not rather the rationality of ‘lazy reason,’ which evades the struggle to clarify the ultimate data [die letzten Vorgegebenheiten]^[7] and the goals and directions which they alone can rationally and truthfully prescribe?” (Hua VI: 14 [Crisis: 16]). Here, the goal is that of clarification (Klärung). There, the proper aim of reason is “world understanding, insight into truth” (Hua V: 96 [83]). Therefore, it is a matter of leading the sciences back to their origin “by work that clarifies <erklärender>, makes distinct <verdeutlichende>, and grounds ultimately,” and “from the primal ground of intuitive givenness” (Hua V: 97 [83]).

Sciences are composed of propositions, and these, of concepts. In turn, concepts are equivalent to word-significations (Hua V: 100 [86]). What function do concepts fulfill? Husserl says: “It is by means of concepts that science is related to the objects of its region” (Hua V: 97 [83]). In turn, concepts are subdivided in three types: (1) logical-formal concepts: like object, property, state of affairs, etc.; (2) regional concepts: for instance, “thing” (Ding); and, (3) material particularizations: like color, tone, etc. On the one hand, the procedure of science is “not altogether a stranger to intuition” (Hua V: 97 [83]). On the other hand, “the concepts, […], are lacking in that clarity which is necessary for cognitive validity” (Hua V: 97 [84]). Therefore, there is a hierarchical order involved because “the sequence of the groups prescribes an order of precedence” (Hua V: 98 [85]). This hierarchy guides the order of the elucidation (Aufklärung). It is so that ontological disciplines precede empirical sciences, since in the universe of ontologies—in the widest sense—“all essences would be included” (Hua V: 99 [85]).

The thesis is that if the ontological telos had been reached, then “The elucidation of the concepts by going back <Rückgang> to primitive essences would thus already have been achieved” (Hua V: 99 [85]). In turn, this thesis leads to: “the idea of a complete realm of ideas, a complete system of all Intuitively conceivable essences” (Hua V: 99 [85]). It also leads to an ideal demand: “the ideal requirement of grounding an all-encompassing system of ontologies in pure Intuitive sources” (Hua V: 99 [85–86]). It is not the matter of “an ideal alien to the world, but a practical ideal […]: an ideal encompassing phenomenology, which for its part encompasses in a certain way all other eidetic disciplines” (Hua V: 100 [86]). In conclusion, it is a question of “the noetic perfection of all sciences” (Hua V: 100 [86]). The consequence is that is not sufficient “with ‘thinking’ by mere word-significations. Rather, we proceed to intuition” (Hua V: 100 [86]). Finally, validity is given and “essence now corresponds to the concept” (Hua V: 100 [86]).

§ 3. Making distinct and making clear

With respect to the complex concept, Husserl distinguished between making distinct (Verdeutlichung) and making clear (Klärung). A concept is “what is meant by a word as such” (Hua V: 101 [87]). Making it distinct “is a procedure that occurs within the mere sphere of thought” (Hua V: 101 [87]). In turn, clarification implies that “we go beyond the sphere of mere word-signification and signifying thinking, we bring the significations into congruity with the noematic side of intuition, the noematic object of the former with that of the latter” (Hua V: 101 [87]). It is a matter of the relation between signification and the intuitive (noema of thinking and noema of intuition) (Hua V: 102 [87]).

Concerning the notion of noema in general, Husserl specifies that this notion is equivalent to “the universalization of the idea of signification to the total province of the acts” (Hua V: 89 [76]). Nevertheless, Husserl duplicates clarification, because it not only unfolds in the previous but also: “a process of clarification <is> executed in the sphere of intuition itself” (Hua V: 103 [89]). In the latter case, an intuition cannot be clear or saturated (satte) enough. Thus, fantasy can be insufficiently lively (lebendige). On the other hand, there is a propaedeutic function related with the distinction (Verdeutlichung) of words. It is a question of distinguishing the word itself with its word-sound, the word-tendency clinging to it, and the noemata (Hua V: 102 [87–88]). The word with its meaning demands a suitable essence and also a fulfilling essence (Hua V: 102 [88]). Accordingly, we have four different processes: (1) A linguistic distinction of a word, namely, the verbal sense-analysis; (2) an analytical logical process of unfolding the word-signification or its equivalent: the concept (Hua V: 87, 100 [75, 86]); (3) a synthetic process, which correlates word-signification and intuition; and, (4) a process that takes place intra-intuition, improving the intuition in the direction of a limit point: “the perfect self-givenness” (Hua V: 103 [89]).

These four processes are eminently teleological, and therefore they involve goals. This teleology is consonant with the fidelity of concepts (treuen Begriffen) to their intuitive vocation (Hua V: 104 [90]). Nevertheless, intuition is not a hunch. Husserl values experience in the psychological sense: “the psychologists say that if intuition is not something mystical then it is experience, and we use that anyway” (Hua V: 45 [39]). With respect to intuition, the role of exemplary intuition is noteworthy: “every phenomenologist continually makes experiments” (Hua V: 52 [45]). These experiments are not supposed to furnish any experience of something real “but rather a bare exemplary intuition as foundation of an eidetic intuition” (Hua V: 52 [45]). It is understanding in the way to become reason. The goals concerned are the third and fourth ones. The third one is “that of producing anew, as it were, the concept already given, nourishing it from the primal source of conceptual validity, i.e., intuition, and giving it within the intuition the partial concepts that belong to its originary essence” (Hua V: 102 [88]). The fourth goal is perfect clarity (volkommene Klarheit). The phenomenological rule to follow is that: “Clarification must follow precisely the stages of constitution of the exemplary object of intuition in question” (Hua V: 103 [88]).

All this supposes that the given is essentially progressive, that “there is for all objects an intuitive nearness and intuitive distance” (Hua V: 104 [89]). The latter reiterates “the general task and the most all-encompassing ideal, although it lies in the infinite” (Hua V: 104 [89]): to embrace the world of ideas in systematic completeness, “the infinite ideal of a system of all ontologies and eidetic disciplines in general” (Hua V: 104 [90]). These ontologies are subordinated to “the laws of formal mathesis, which therefore also stands as the mother, so to speak, of all ontologies in their series” (Hua V: 72 [62]).

§ 4. Ontology and phenomenology

For Husserl, there is inseparability between the system of ontologies and the system of phenomenological disciplines. Nevertheless, distinctio non est separatio: “For, in itself […] ontology is not phenomenology” (Hua V: 129 [117]). The first one presupposes insights of an ontological character, performed “in the framework of axiomatic clarity” (Hua V: 105 [90]). The second one arises from “a mere shift of view” (Hua V: 105 [90]) as the universe of phenomenological insights. Husserl understands phenomenology as “the eidetic theory of lived-processes that is incorporated in the idea of a rational psychology” (Hua V: 43 [38]). The pivot of phenomenology is the notion of Erlebnis. Yet, how does Husserl understand this notion? “Then a lived-process <Erlebnis> is something psychic as state of the psyche, i.e., of a human or animate Ego, of this reality founded in physical nature” (Hua V: 74 [63]). Another contrast between ontology and phenomenology is given by the counterpoint between analysis and description of essences, and deductions (Hua V: 60 [59–60]). Another difference between ontology and phenomenology is:

As phenomenologists we also execute positings, actual theoretical position-takings, but they are exclusively directed toward lived-processes and lived-process correlates. In ontology, on the other hand, we perform actual positings that are directed toward the objects pure and simple, instead of toward the correlates and objects in quotation marks (Hua V: 88 [76]).

Finally, the fourth difference is that between ontological and phenomenological intuition (Intuition) (Hua V: 92 [79]).

The ontologically founded investigation becomes complete “only through the thoroughly reflective work of phenomenology” (Hua V: 105 [90]). Now, the path leading to the so-called kinetic phenomenology (Hua V: 1 [1]) is partially indicated by ontologies as indexes of noetic-noematic correlations. Thus, the task is: “The apprehension—to be carried out by the phenomenological method—of every ontological theorem as an index <Index> for quite definitive connections of transcendental consciousness” (Hua V: 77 [66]). The concept of Anzeichen is rejected in the Logische Untersuchungen on behalf of the concept of Ausdrück, given that the expression carries the signification (Bedeutung) as an idea. Regarding the index, it is a transcendental concept that leads to a transcendental semiotic that serves us as Ariadna’s thread from ontologies to phenomenology. Husserl’s path is similar to Plato’s psychagogy, understood as the art of souls guidance, because it appeals readers to see for themselves, after following the indications: “One can see all that, can bring it to clear givenness for oneself; and whoever has followed our exhibitions has seen it with us” (Hua V: 12 [10]). The only thing left is to surprise the phenomenon in fraganti.

Thus, we reach phenomenology as “the maternal ground <Mutterboden> from which all ontological insights grow” (Hua V: 105 [90]). Ontology is “katastematic”, because “it takes the unities in their identity, […] as something fixed” (Hua V: 129 [117]). In turn, the phenomenological constitutive consideration is kinetic or genetic—“our phenomenological-kinetic method” (Hua V: 129 [117])—because it “takes the unity in the flow, namely as unity of a constitutive flow; it follows up the movements, the flows, in which such unity and every component, side, real property of such unity is the correlate of identity” (Hua V: 129 [117]). Thereby, Husserl asks and answers in Die Idee der Phänomenologie: “We move in the field of pure phenomena. But why do I say field? It is more nearly a Heraclitean flux of phenomena” (Hua II: 47 [37]). We conclude: (a) The phenomenological method is asymmetrical with respect to the ontological method, because the first one is essentially linked to phenomenology, as a home where we must always return: “Phenomenology […] is the maternal ground of all philosophical method: to this ground and to the work in it, everything leads back” (Hua V: 80 [69]). (b) In phenomenology and ontology, Heraclitus and Parmenides—the two Janus’ faces of Greek philosophy—meet.

§ 5. Phenomenological method and metaphorization

As a last consideration, Husserl’s metaphorization is inextricably linked to his method. First, the “light of phenomenology” (Hua V: 75 [64]) is related to the crucial role of seeing (Hua V: 12 [10]). It is also related to the teleological movement from obscure and confused thinking towards intuitive knowledge. An example of the terminus ad quem of this movement is “the overwhelming insight into the total structure <Gesamtbau> of consciousness” (Hua V: 56 [48]). Second, Husserl elaborates a geological map of the given, where strata (Schichten), interweavings (Verflechtungen), and superpositions (Ineinander) abound. Third, nothing is given on one plane, but always related to a foreground, a middle distance, and a background.^[8] Fourth, it is a question of tracing the sources (Quellen) from which ontologies spring. It is critical to arrive at a ground (Boden), namely the origin, whether as primordial ground (Urboden), or as maternal ground (Mutterboden).

References

Husserl, Edmund. 1950 ff. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl Gesammelte Werke. Den Haag/Dordrecht/London/New York: Kluwer Academic Publisher/Martinus Nijhoff/Springer.

Hua II. 1958. Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen. Ed. Walter Biemel = 1964. The Idea of Phenomenology. Trans. William P. Alton and George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (quoted as The Idea).

Hua V. 1971. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Ed. Marly Biemel = 1980. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of Science. Trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (quoted as Ideas III).

Hua VI. 1962. Die Krisis der europaïschen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Ed. Walter Biemel = 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press (quoted as Crisis).

Kant, Immanuel. 1974. Kritik der reinen Vernunft 2. Werkausgabe. Band IV. Ed. Wilhelm Weischedel. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp = 2009. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von. 1908. Philosophical Works of Leibnitz. Trans. George Martin Duncan. New Haven: Tuttle/Morehouse & Taylor Co.

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