Trabajo de campo – Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) – 11-25 de mayo, 2018

Capítulo I:

1. “When the Foundation arrived in Argentina in 1959, the social science landscape was relatively barren.” (Manitzas, 1971: 1).
2. “I would hazard the guess that part of the Argentine phenomenon can be explained by the role Argentine economists have implicitly accepted for their profession. Particularly during the last five years or so, a large segment of the economics community has been willing to function as technocrats. By this I mean that, in their professional roles, they have been willing to leave “politics” and social (or structural) variables to one side and to attend only to matters that fit, by narrow definition, within the traditional purview of economics” (Manitzas, 1971: 12).
3. “The present deterioration of the Argentine economy, in a country that has a comparative wealth both of economic resources and economic expertise, has little to do with conventional economics and much to do with the failure to establish a viable and coherent political order” (Manitzas, 1971: 5).
4. “Second, if in our work we tend to give special weight to disciplines bearing on the more pressing social problems we identify in each country, then in Argentina we should probably give more emphasis than we have heretofore to political science. However advantaged the Argentine may appear alongside other Third World societies in terms of science capacity, educational plant, industrial growth, and other indicators of developmental progress, they are woefully lagging on the political front. While we have noted among ourselves the effects of such “underdeveloped” politics on the institutional matrix of Argentine society, the Foundation staff have never assigned any special priority to building indigenous strength in political science in Argentina” (Manitzas, 1971: 26).
5. “Initially, the four field offices that have operated in the region emphasized economic growth and efficiency. With experience, however, they came increasingly to believe that addressing broader social and political problems was essential to the region’s development. That led staff to emphasize enhancing the ability of Latin Americans to make rational choices among important policy options facing their societies. A major component in carrying out that objective was creating a cadre of highly competent social scientists and developing good research and training as a base for policy choices” (Fundación Ford, 1986: 2).
6. “The applicant had to have an institutional base in Argentina with a commitment to return, while the sponsor would continue all of part of the man’s salary up to two years of a study abroad” (Carmichael, 1973).
7. “The Foundation’s fellowship program removed a whole generation of students from Argentina, and facilitated their advanced studies in Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, Cambridge, Oxford, and Paris, just as the pillars of argentine social sciences began to crumble” (Cleaves, 1979).
8. “The founders of the Institute had in mind the model of the Brookings Institution in organizing the social science cluster of centers” (Bell, 1967).
9. “The Center now has a permanent core staff in Buenos Aires of thirteen senior researchers, five of whom have already obtained doctoral degrees in economics from Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, or Yale. Another five are currently completing their doctoral dissertations for North American universities” (Wilhelm, 1967: 2).
10. “The social science centers have collaborated in joint research with U.S. and European universities, the Brookings Institute and others; staff members have served as visiting professors in the U.S. and Britain and a number teach part-time in Argentine universities. Several have been advisors to the Inter-American Development Bank and several government economic and financial agencies, including the Central Bank” (Nagel, 1968: 1).
11. “For these reasons, the Foundation has relied heavily on the Institute in seeking to advance Foundation objectives in Argentina and throughout Latin America, most notably in our efforts to help improve the quality and relevance of research, teaching, and application in the social sciences” (Bell, 1969: 2).
12. “This arrangement seems to be a more solid on than merely dispatching CIAP fellows who may never return or at least have no place to return to” (Carlson 1971a: 2).
13. “Kal also notes that the Institute has failed to fulfill its moral commitment to do the best they could with the political science and administration types, and suggests that we should not so blandly accept the voiding of this commitment. I would agree with Kal that Di Tella’s treatment of CIAP staff, who are a talented and sensitive group of scholars, has been shameful and that the reasons for this treatment are political rather than academic” (Hakim, 1974).
14. “The background materials on the endowment grant which I have read, however, contain no explicit reference to a commitment to political science, not is such a commitment mentioned in the memorandum of understanding. Foundation staff may have taken for granted that Di Tella, which was viewed as a scholarly and humanistic organization, would do all it could to sustain such an important intellectual resource such as CIAP. But that has not been the case. We in the Foundation have from the outset of the endowment grant voiced our concern over CIAP’s situation, but we do not have any “legal” basis or leverage for requiring a change in that situation” (Hakim, 1974).
15. While I am not attempting to reiterate that discussion here, I will quickly re-state my own position, that for ethical as well as budgetary reasons, and because it is more effective, we must state our own values and objectives more explicitly, taking cognizance of Latin interests” (Gardner, 1972).
16. “This perception is reflected in their classroom comportment. The more vociferous among them, largely of Peronist persuasion, reject any teaching they do not consider “relevant” to their political purpose.” […] “It is a sad commentary on the state of indigenous political thinking when young “progressive” nationalists have no better literature to turn to than the eclectic, unsystematized writings of Evita and Juan Domingo Perón” (Manitzas, 1971: 14).
17. “In discussions during and subsequent to the New Delhi OLAC meetings, it appeared that some Representatives in Latin America did not feel that their countries had yet achieved a sufficiently developed array of PhD or equivalent talent and preferred to continue with their training priorities. Moreover, they were also skeptical about mounting a sub-regional “concurso” involving two or three countries at the outset. They felt it might be better the try the innovation in a single country as a pilot project to check the feasibility and to test the risks.” […] “In short, it seemed an opportune moment to move away from fellowship training and institutional development per se and to look for ways and means of deepening rather than just broadening the stock of talent” (Gardner, 1973: 3).

Capítulo II:

1. “The two groups see their roles as complementary and will continue to share office space, library, and other facilities and will collaborate, as before, on research, seminars, and training projects of mutual interest” (Dye, 1975).
2. “CEMA will not branch out from this intellectual perspective, nor will it even attempt to hold fore which would include members of other perspective” (Thery, 1983a).
3. “The choice of the state as the central theme of CEDES’ endeavors also involves a history in which we are entwined. About two and a half years ago in Cuernavaca, several of us from the Foundation were involved in an important discussion with the Joint Committee concerning the advisability of their developing several field of scholarly emphasis. After a day and a half of discussion, the decision was unanimously taken that somewhere in the tangle of phenomena we call “state,” “nation,” “participation,” “citizenship,” “government” lay the greatest promise for understanding Latin American development” (Silvert, 1975).
4. “First, the interdependence of economic, political, and social variables in the national area should be reflected in our own approach to the social sciences. Economics, nurtured in isolation and without the reinforcement of its sister discipline, is impoverished. Especially in the so-called Third World, the emergence of an economics profession that ignores social and political variables and eschews structural questions and analysis can actually, in the long run, be counter-productive. At best, it will provide only partial answers; at worst, it can distort the development process in ways not easy to correct” (Manitzas, 1971: 25).
5. “Unwilling to lay all the blame at the door of the military or foreign powers, the Committee wanted, and continues to want, the development of a truly broad and sophisticated approach to Latin American political phenomena, writ large” (Silvert, 1975: 2).
6. “The rationale for these two actions essentially reflected the Foundation’s overall strategy for work in the contemporary Southern Cone: namely, to help preserve a certain pool of well-trained scholars in that troubled sub-region; to assist in maintaining a margin of free ‘intellectual space’ in a highly repressive environment; and to support competent, independent, and creative research that might serve to illuminate the causes of the current breakdown in the Southern Cone and explore alternative options and models for the future. The assumptions underlying this strategy are that the present military regimes in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are not eternal; that there are, in fact, more just and effective ways of achieving ‘development’ in the modern world; and that, in the meantime, there are important lessons to be learned from the Southern cone experience” (Manitzas 1979a).
7. “Most of the senior scholars are highly competitive in the international marketplace, and would be welcome in creative academic ambiances in the northern hemisphere. O’Donnell, Balán, Oszlak, and Canitrot would have little difficulty doubling or tripling their salary in one or another foreign institution” (Cleaves, 1979).
8. “From the early Argentina experience, a number of principles evolved. The first Foundation programs were found to be too expensive, overly-generous (salaries were paid), and created dependencies or “wards” of the Foundation. Awards since have been limited to travel and a minimum of initial maintenance” (Dye, 1976).
9. “Although we have never defined the concept, we have a continuing concern with what we call ‘networks.’ CEDES is one of those rare institutions that is not only plugged into the Latin American circuit, but also has strong links to academic centers in the United States and Europe. It is thus a vehicle not only for knitting Argentines into the fabric of Latin American scholarship, but also for extending the outreach of Latin American social science to colleagues in other regions” (Manitzas, 1976: 4-5).
10. “The more tactical purpose of the grant would be to assure a minimal financial platform for CEDES’ continued operations, with the understanding that the Foundation’s contribution would be amply complemented by funding from other donors. The grant would be programmed over three years to give CEDES the time and opportunity to seek substantial, longer-term financing in international circles” (Manitzas, 1976).
11. “CEDES staff will emphasize longer-range, theoretical research on the underlying social, economic, and political dimensions of government and bureaucracy in Argentina and in Latin America, while Sábato’s group will carry on the more traditional public administration and technical assistance functions performed by CIAP” (Dye, 1975).
12. “He said that a number of things were troublesome, in particular the polarization and the longer-range problem of reintegration of elites, dissidents, or third forces into the educational and governmental bureaucracies. He agreed with the importance of independent research institutions as a device to save intellectual standards, but saw a problem with them in the long run. He has noticed an unwillingness on the part of those who have stayed outside the system to bridge gaps with the governmental and educational intellectuals who have stayed within it. It is easier for them to continue to work with the Ford Foundation and the outside world than to start the painful process of communication with people whom they despise or find ethically wanting. Certainly, at some point, they should be reintegrated into the national framework” (Dye, 1976: 3).

Capítulo III:

1. “In both the United States and in Latin America, the stated goal of social science research is to generate knowledge which accurately describes social reality. In the United States, such a statement is sometimes followed by the assertion that responsible governmental and private entities will be able to use this knowledge to take action, which will improve the human condition consistent with their stated objectives. Even less frequently in the United States a third statement is articulated that such knowledge is particularly needed and can be particularly helpful for improving conditions of life for disadvantaged segments of national populations. For these reasons, as well as in pursuit of the objective of the creation of knowledge and its application to selected areas, the Ford Foundation has had a longstanding concern for the promotion of social science in Latin America. These considerations are as important for the proposed program in international economics and international politics as they are for other areas in which the Foundation will be involved in the years to come. The generation of knowledge which can be used to alleviate human suffering requires both sensitive, skilled researchers and institutions which can accumulate and disseminate research findings as well as effective links with support over the lives of their projects and to establish a base which can be used to accumulate findings and to provide means of systematically placing them in hands which can use them for more direct social action” (Goodman, 1980).
2. “In the 1980s, as many countries in this region began transitions to democratic rule, the Foundation helped several centers undertake research, policy analysis and dialogue on democratic institutions and processes. Little attention had been paid to how existing mechanisms function in most countries, or how they might be changed to channel demands and resolve conflict more effectively. The goal was to strengthen the capacity of social scientists to address the practical problems of democratic governance, and thereby speed the process of institutional renewal and consolidation” (Fundación Ford, 1986).
3. “In this setting, our program strategy is to support efforts generating quality information and analysis on issues recognized as central to future public policy and redemocratization efforts” (Thery, 1983b).
4. “In addition to providing CEDES with administrative support, the Ford Foundation funded research projects at CEDES on political institutions and economic policymaking during periods of redemocratization. Their objective was to promote a better understanding of the process of democratic transition under the Alfonsín government and to provide policy recommendations aimed at strengthening democratic practices and institutions. A second objective was to provide guidance for economic policymaking in a democratic context” (Valenzuela, 1987).
5. “The new projects under exploration, we believe, will continue this high standard of policy relevance and potential for impact. In particular, we are hopeful that significant opportunities to encourage broad debate of the issues in our region by a wide variety of publics and not just scholars will emerge over the next few months” (Dye, 1980).
6. “The evaluation of CEDES suggests that the objectives of the Ford Foundation were worth pursuing and that for the most part the objectives were met. And, through particular support of the political science projects of CEDES, the Foundation has added to CEDES’ capacity to have some impact on the process of democratic transition through its research and outreach activities” (Valenzuela, 1987).
7. “It would be interesting to know whether the SSRC funds on hand come from a Ford Foundation grant” (Puryear, 1983).
8. “To summarize the argument to this point, the enterprise is a promising one, the need is great, the support sought from the Foundation at this initial stage realistically could not be gotten elsewhere, and the price, generally speaking, is right (both in current and prospective terms). It has also been noted that Foundation support for CEDES, if it is to be timely and effective, needs to be mobilized quickly” (Dye, 1975).
9. “In sum, we are clearly betting on the individuals involved here, clearly comfortable with the general quality and (State) focus of the endeavor, and building toward the institutional environment wherein the CEDES researchers can realize their considerable potential” (Gardner, 1975).
10. “At a more practical level, a substantial portion of CEDES’ senior staff were trained abroad at the graduate level with fellowships financed by the Foundation. Helping to keep the group together and productively working in Argentina can be seen as a means of protecting and capitalizing on an earlier investment” (Manitzas, 1976: 5).