The Case of Greater Mekong Subregion

NGUYEN Han Giang

Abstract

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) is a vital rice-exporting region for the world. However, climate change has severely impacted local agricultural productivity, putting millions of people’s livelihoods at greater risk and exacerbating regional poverty. This climate-induced poverty becomes a major economic driver of labor migration across the GMS. Annually, an estimated 3 to 5 million individuals migrate – many of whom are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Despite various opportunities and challenges this migration wave poses, there is little discussion on how climate change and labor migration are inextricably linked. This gap hinders the region’s ability to take advantage of this phenomenon for regional economic development while simultaneously protecting the rights and security of labor migrants.

This paper aims to bridge the gap by exploring how to utilize labor migration as a climate change adaptation strategy in the GMS region. Based on Jamie Draper’s approach, it will examine (i) firstly, the economic drivers shaped by climate change, and the economic benefits that regional migration phenomenon brings to GMS as part of climate adaptation strategies; (ii) secondly, the progress and remaining gaps of including labor migration into the current GMS climate change and human rights framework; and (iii) finally, actionable recommendations for GMS countries to effectively harness labor migration as a tool for climate change adaptation while ensuring the protection of labor migrants.
    
Keywords: Climate change, labor migration, economic development, Human rights.

Résumé

La sous-région du Grand Mékong (GMS) constitue un pôle essentiel d’exportation de riz à l’échelle mondiale. Toutefois, les effets du changement climatique ont gravement affecté la productivité agricole locale, mettant en péril les moyens de subsistance de millions de personnes et aggravant la pauvreté régionale. Cette pauvreté induite par le climat devient ainsi un facteur économique déterminant des migrations de travail au sein de la GMS. Chaque année, on estime que 3 à 5 millions de personnes migrent, dont beaucoup sont exposées à des risques d’exploitation et d’abus. Malgré les nombreuses opportunités et les défis que représente cette dynamique migratoire, les liens intrinsèques entre changement climatique et migration de travail demeurent peu explorés. Cette lacune limite la capacité de la région à tirer parti de ce phénomène en faveur du développement économique régional, tout en assurant la protection des droits et de la sécurité des travailleurs migrants. Cet article vise à combler cette lacune en examinant comment la migration de travail peut être mobilisée comme stratégie d’adaptation au changement climatique dans la région du Grand Mékong. S’appuyant sur l’approche de Jamie Draper, il analyse : (i) les facteurs économiques façonnés par le changement climatique ainsi que les bénéfices économiques que la migration régionale peut générer dans une perspective d’adaptation ; (ii) les avancées et les lacunes persistantes dans l’intégration de la migration de travail dans les cadres actuels de la GMS relatifs au changement climatique et aux droits de la personne ; et (iii) des recommandations opérationnelles à l’intention des États de la GMS afin d’exploiter efficacement la migration de travail comme levier d’adaptation climatique, tout en garantissant la protection des travailleurs migrants.
   
Mots-clés : changement climatique, migration de travail, développement économique, droits de la personne.

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Climate change impacts are already influencing population movement in significant ways^[1]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a warning in 1992, highlighting the potential severity of climate change’s impact on human mobility due to shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, and severe drought.^[2] The Greater Mekong Sub-region is the most evident region, with an estimated 6.3 million climate migrants by 2050, primarily in the form of labor migration. This is because the main livelihood of the region’s 334 million people^[3] – agriculture— is being disrupted by climate change. This exposure leads to approximately 3-5 million individuals leaving the Mekong region for labor migration annually.^[4] Many studies suggest that well-managed labor migration offers a positive opportunity for migrants and communities to increase their adaptive capacity to adverse climate change impacts.^[5] Notably, the Working Group II Report of the Sixth Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change acknowledges that labor migration could contribute to climate-resilient development^[6].

1.1. Overview of the Greater Mekong Subregion

The Greater Mekong Subregion is a trans-national region of the Mekong River basin in Southeast Asia, comprising Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China (specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Lao People’s Democratic Republic , Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam.^[7] In 1992, with assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), these six countries entered into a program of subregional economic cooperation,^[8] aiming to foster regional development, economic integration, and connectivity through projects in infrastructure, trade, investment, and sustainable development.

The Mekong River is the 12th longest river in the world and the longest river in Southeast Asia, with a length of 4,350 km, flowing through 6 countries in the GMS.^[9] The basin is home to one of the richest areas of biodiversity in the world, with more than 20,000 plant species and 850 fish species discovered to date.^[10] The Mekong River Basin (MRB) can be divided into two sections.^[11] The Upper Mekong Basin (UMB) comprises an area in China where the Mekong is known as the Lancang River, which makes up 24% of the total Mekong Basin (190,800 km2).^[12] The Lower Mekong River Basin (LMB) is functionally subdivided into four geographic regions – a large part of northeastern Thailand, almost the entire countries of Lao PDR and Cambodia, and the southern tip of Viet Nam.^[13]

1.2. The Impacts of Climate Change and Human Mobility in the Greater Mekong Sub‑Region

GMS is ranked as one of the region’s most vulnerable under climate change.^[14] The region is affected by higher air temperature on average, extended abnormal rainfall amounts, abnormal flooding patterns, and sea level rise combined with salinity intrusion in the coastal areas.^[15] Supparkorn^[16] anticipated that if the CO2 amount in the atmosphere doubles from nowadays, the rainfall in the whole Mekong Region will change not only in terms of intensity but also duration and frequency. Consequently, this phenomenon entails various potential risks to the regional agriculture, then degrading the lives and livelihoods of the local communities.^[17]

The impacts of climate change can be categorized into two types. Firstly, sudden-onset events like landslides, floods, or cyclones typically have immediate consequences, affect massive populations, and cause loss of life and housing. These disasters force people to leave their homes rapidly due to the urgent threat, known as displacement.^[18] Meanwhile, “slow onset” events, like rising sea levels or desertification^[19] are gradual, incremental environmental changes that can lead to significant impacts over time. These two climate impacts have far-reaching influence on human mobility in the GMS, especially in LMB – a low coastal regions and places experiencing increased urbanization.^[20] The LMB has a history of migration and mobility practices in part because of seasonal change, as well as weather and climate-related impacts that cause hardships and reduce livelihoods and influence mobility decisions.^[21] According to some estimates, by 2050, without concrete climate and development action, climate change may compel close to 6.3 million in the Lower Mekong to migrate within their countries.^[22] Specifically, nearly three-quarters of displacements – about 74 percent – occurred in Myanmar and Vietnam alone.^[23]

1.3. Labor Migration as an Instrument for Climate Change Adaptation

1.3.1. Definition of Labor Migration

International Labour Organization (ILO) classified these targets as “migrant worker” or labor migrants (the two terms are used interchangeably),^[24] who are to be engaged, is engaged, or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.^[25] In broader terms, labor migration (or labor mobility) is defined as the movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment.^[26]

From this section onward, the terms “migrant worker”, “labor migrant” and “climate-induced labor migrant” will be used interchangeably, which is more specific in highlighting employment as the primary reason for migration. Since the scope of this article is within the GMS, migrants in this context refer exclusively to the movement across an international border.

1.3.2. Definition of “Climate Change Adaptation”

Climate change adaptation, in the most generic sense of the term, is simply “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects”.^[27] The outcome of the adaptation process is expected to make those who face those effects more resilient.^[28] Simply, it is the ‘ability to resist, recover from, or adapt to the effects of a shock or a change.^[29]

There are three dimensions seen as the critical features of resilience: absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, and transformative capacity.^[30] Firstly, absorptive capacity involves the ability of a system to withstand and recover from the immediate impacts of climate-related events, maintaining its essential functions and structures.^[31] On the other hand, transformative is the ability to adjust, modify, or change characteristics and actions to moderate potential future impacts from shocks and stresses so as to continue to function without major qualitative changes.^[32] Lastly, adaptation is characterized by a set of actions and processes that help societies to adjust to the impacts of adverse changes to the climate.^[33] In this context, to support the argument that labor migration is an effective strategy for adapting to climate change, it is necessary to demonstrate how migration contributes to enhancing the resilience of local communities across these three dimensions.

According to Jamie Draper, the resilience of local communities to the impacts of climate change can be significantly strengthened if they are able to cope with one of its most severe consequences – poverty.^[34] In fact, increasing levels of climate-induced poverty have become one of the main factors prompting people to move and seek employment outside of their communities in GMS – a point further explored in Section 2.1. Given this fact, if labor migration policy can function as a tool for climate change adaptation, then it is critical to turn to the question of the role of labor migration policy in the project of tackling climate-induced poverty.^[35] This core question forms the basis of the analysis presented in Section 2 of this article.

2. Place of Labor Migration in Climate Change Adaptation Strategy

Labor migration has been occurring in the GMS for centuries, largely in an informal and unregulated fashion.^[36] Most migrants are irregular – those engaging in movement outside the laws^[37] – and low-skilled migrants – those possessing minimal education and training with little specialized knowledge.^[38] In this dynamic, Thailand is the subregional hub for labor migration and hosts 60% of the total migrants, 80% of whom are from Myanmar.^[39] Major cities within the region, such as Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, and Kunming, are also found to be significant points of attraction for migrants.^[40] This growing influx of migrants prompts important questions: What drives people in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) to migrate more than in other regions, and what are they seeking through this movement? One significant answer is climate change. Building on Draper’s framework, this argument will be demonstrated through two key points (i) climate change-induced poverty acts as an economic driver of labor migration in the GMS; and (ii) labor migration, in turn, contributes to enhancing the resilience of local communities by supporting their adaptation to climate change.

2.1. Climate-Induced Poverty as an Economic Driver of Labor Migration in the Mekong Region

To conduct a multidimensional examination of the motivations driving individuals to migrate abroad, conventional migration studies suggest using the ‘Push and Pull’ model.^[41] Pull factors are conditions in destination countries that attract individuals or groups to leave their home. On the other hand, the push factor is the situation that forces individuals to move.^[42] The ILO defines the pull factor for labor migration as better economic or education opportunities, more jobs, and the promise of a better life, whilst the push factors can be conflicts, human rights violations, discrimination, intolerance, persecution, doubt, and famine. According to Draper, the most serious outcome of climate change is poverty, a push factor, which contributes to the economic driver of labor migration.^[43] Poverty is a multi-dimensional and complex concept, making it difficult to measure and analyze.^[44] World Bank defines poverty as the deprivation in well-being, where well‑being can be measured by an individual possession of income, health, nutrition, education, assets, housing, and certain rights in a society such as rights to stay or education.^[45]

Over the centuries, poverty has remained widespread in the Mekong region, particularly in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, with rates ranging from 9% to 34% of the population.^[46] Climate change further exacerbates this issue, especially in areas where livelihoods are heavily dependent on natural resources. Key resources such as groundwater, seawater, and land, which are essential for sustaining agriculture^[47] – the region’s primary economic sector – are gradually disappearing due to climate change.^[48] For example, a recent case study in the lower Mekong basin shows that changes in rainfall patterns due to climate change lead to more severe droughts and groundwater salinization.^[49] This extreme precipitation severely impacts farming, causing the loss of crops and productive assets such as fruit trees and livestock.^[50] Even more concerning, marginal farmers – those with limited resources – are particularly vulnerable. Faced with significant environmental changes, they are often unable to take the risk of experimenting with new farming technologies due to their limited access to financing for improved agricultural inputs.^[51] These contextual elements result in the loss of household incomes and uncertain living conditions, leading to the increasing demand for moving to other places to seek new employment opportunities. Along with the high demand for low-skilled workers in the fishery sector, it has ultimately created a labor migration corridor from the GMS region to Thailand.^[52] This case is a typical example of how slow-onset climate events exacerbate the situation of poverty, driving people to labor migration.

2.2. Economic Benefits of Using Labor Migration as Climate Change Adaptation in the Mekong Region

Taking Draper’s approach into account, labor migration is seen as a means to reduce climate‑induced poverty, which can further strengthen people’s resilience to climate impacts and regional economic growth.^[53] As discussed in Part 1.3.2, resilience, comprising three elements of absorb, transform, and adapt, is the ultimate objective of climate change adaptation strategy.

Climate change adversely affects people’s livelihoods, leading to the loss of employment opportunities in traditional agriculture, fisheries, and forestry.^[54] In terms of absorptive capacity, an increase in labor migration can provide access to decent work, directly reducing vulnerability^[55] by ensuring financial stability while also contributing to the development of migrants’ communities of origin.^[56] For example, those who move from a low-to a high-income state can increase their own earnings,^[57] and the remittances they send to family members can help their family to recover from the deterioration of local economics.^[58] Draper argued that temporary migrants – who with the intention to return to the country of origin – are often particularly effective in promoting poverty reduction and development.^[59] This is because migrants with short-term stays or plans tend to remit a higher proportion of their income.^[60]

Moving to the transformative element, Draper insisted that labor migration policy should focus on restructuring the existing local workforce mechanisms, making it less likely to be maladaptive than other interventions,^[61] because it addresses the problem through bottom-up adaptation, encouraging an equitable participation of people in responding to climate change impacts. Accordingly, the feasible policies are suggested to include financing skills training programs,^[62] bridging skill gaps by equipping local workers with the necessary skills to work in foreign countries, and providing housing and employment assistance to labor migrants.^[63] By doing this, these policies will enable them to transition toward alternative livelihoods rather than remaining overly dependent on natural resources without adequate preparation.^[64] These efforts, when combined with other climate change mitigation strategies, will enhance the resilience of vulnerable communities in coping with the unpredictable and uncertain impacts of climate change rather than solely focusing on minimizing its risks and vulnerabilities.

On the foundation of Draper’s research, it lays the solid ground to believe that labor migration will be the most essential and effective adaptation strategy for the Mekong River basin region. Firstly, one of the main benefits of migration for Mekong region countries is the receipt of remittances. In fact, remittance flows throughout the Mekong sub-region have increased significantly over the decades.^[65] While intra-GMS remittances are mostly informal and therefore hard to quantify,^[66] according to World Bank data,^[67] remittance inflows in the GMS in 2011 range from $8.6 billion in Viet Nam, where they account for 5.1% of GDP, to $45 million in the Lao PDR (0.6% of GDP). Meanwhile, Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2009 highlighted that remittances in Cambodia represent a small fraction of the mean household incomes, with an average of KR83,077.8 ($20.6).^[68] Although this data does not distinguish between households receiving remittances from migrant workers and those that do not, if considering only households receiving remittances, the actual share of remittances in household income is significantly higher.^[69] Moreover, remittances from labor migration are mainly used for household expenses, education of the children, agricultural production, and sometimes, for community development,^[70] which not only robust the average incomes of households, but also the community and the home country. Secondly, the availability of low-skilled migrant workers in destination countries is undoubtedly beneficial to employers, who can hire cheap labor and increase their productivity.^[71] In Thailand, sectors such as fisheries or agriculture are competitive due to the abundance of migrant labor, which prevents labor shortage in industry and ensures low wages and, thus, competitive prices.^[72] In this sense, low-skilled labor migration mainly benefits employers, with a repercussion on gross domestic product (GDP) and growth.^[73] The possibility of keeping prices low by hiring cheap labor also reduces upward pressure on inflation, thus benefiting national consumers, as is the case in Thailand.

Briefly, while the Asian Development Bank emphasizes that “international migration can play a key role in fostering the resilience of households and communities as it helps to address climate‑induced poverty” ^[74], it also brings significant challenges. On one hand, irregular migration contributes to the economies of both the sending and destination countries. On the other hand, it traps migrant workers in a cycle of vulnerability.^[75] If in their home countries, they are “exploited” by poverty driven by climate change, then upon migrating, they face labor exploitation, harassment, and even the risk of human trafficking due to the lack of legal status.^[76] These issues will be further analyzed and discussed in 2.3.3 “Legal Framework to Protect Migrant Workers”.

2.3. Protecting Labor Migrant’s Rights in the Mekong Framework on Climate Change

The Mekong region lacks a dedicated legal and policy framework that directly addresses labor migration as a climate adaptation strategy.^[77] However, GMS states have clearly exhibited their commitment to several international and regional frameworks, such as the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and most importantly, the Southeast Asia Environment Framework.^[78] On 12 October 2024, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including five member states of GMS, submitted a Joint Statement on Climate Change to COP29^[79] to acknowledge that climate change would negatively affect basic human necessities.

In 1995, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam concluded the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin and formed the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which has been lauded as the most progressive river institution and a model for the world.^[80] With the aim of sustainable development and poverty alleviation, MRC tries to “minimize harmful effects of Mekong water on people and the environment in the Lower Mekong Basin”.^[81] Additionally, there are numerous soft initiatives and action strategies under MRC to guide the implementation of adaptive measures in the national dimension and coordinate in the transboundary dimension to cope with climate change, including Climate Change and Adaptation Initiative (CCAI) & Mekong Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan (MASAP), Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program (GMS-ECP).^[82]

2.3.1. ASEAN Framework on Including Labor Migrations in Climate Change Adaptation

The Mekong region is part of ASEAN (except for China), which was established in 1967 and now consists of 10 member states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia.^[83] While ASEAN’s current climate policies do not specifically address climate-induced labor migration, they pave the way to protect climate-induced labor migrants, which helps alleviate the root cause of the issue.^[84]

The three pillars constituting the ASEAN Community include (i) the Political-Security Community, (ii) the Economic Community, and (iii) the Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Each of these pillars has its own Blueprint, which is part of the ‘Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2025.^[85] The spirit to fight climate change of all ASEAN member states (AMS) has been clearly exhibited in this Vision. The most significant aspect is that the ASCC has dedicated Section D to outlining ASEAN’s commitments to climate change and environmental resilience, specifically, Section D.4 focuses on “Strengthened Social Protection for Migrant Workers in Climate-Sensitive Areas to Reduce Vulnerabilities in Times of Climate Change-Related Crises, Disasters, and Other Environmental Changes”.^[86] This marks a significant policy advancement in ASEAN’s climate change response compared to the “Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015”,^[87] which only acknowledges climate action in Section D.10 and does not mention specific measures for climate change adaptation, enhancing resilience, or protecting the rights of climate migrants, including labor migrants.^[88]

ASEAN itself has issued several declarations highlighting the intersection between migrant worker protection and climate change.^[89] For example, the 2023 Declaration on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Family Members in Crisis Situations^[90] calls for the protection of migrant populations in the context of risks posed by “layered compounding natural hazards and interconnected economies which are exacerbated by the impact of growing ageing population, rapid urbanization, climate change and mobility of people”.^[91] Also, the 2020 Declaration on Human Resources Development for the Changing World of Work calls for actions to increase skills, training, and education, including “inclusivity of education and employment for all… and mutual recognition of skills to support mobility of skilled labour”.^[92] The legal effects of these Declarations are still in question, but they provide a great reference on policy and direction of ASEAN towards climate change and labor mobility.

2.3.2. Mekong Framework on Including Labor Migrations in Climate Change Adaption

As discussed in Part 1.2, the most serious consequence of climate change on GMS is water flows, causing GMS livelihood damage and poverty – the key driver behind the labor migration. To effectively address the issue of hydrological flow, the substantive rules of the 1995 Mekong Agreement (Mekong Agreement) are necessary to assess the flexibility of its principles concerning water utilization and water quantity.^[93] Having said that, the root cause of the issue remains the tension surrounding dam development in China – as the upstream state remains unresolved due to China’s non-participation in this treaty. Accordingly, the Treaty does not have a water-sharing clause,^[94] whilst the impact of climate change necessitates the inclusion of water-sharing provisions in the Treaty.^[95]

Acknowledging that the Mekong Agreement alone is insufficient, the MRC established the CCAI in 2009.^[96] This initiative aims to understand and reduce the impacts of climate change and build the capacity of Member States to adapt to the consequences of climate change.^[97] MASAP is a part of CCAI, whose purpose is to build awareness of climate change and its consequences and support the resilience of Member States in the Lower Mekong Basin.^[98] Alongside with MASAP, the MRC has taken into account existing relevant initiatives, including the 2016-2020 Integrated Water Resources Management-based Basin Development Strategy (BDS), the 2016-2020 Strategic Plan, and the 2009-2025 Climate Change and Adaptation Initiative (CCAI) Framework Document.^[99] These policy-based and vulnerability-based adaptation measures^[100] create an enabling environment, such as financial and information systems and human resource capacity through technical and infrastructure solutions for local people. The resilience of the community is also directed by MASAP through seven priority areas, including the priority of cooperation and partnership, transboundary and gender sensitive adaptation framework, and capacity building.^[101]

2.3.3. ASEAN and Mekong Framework on Migrant Worker Rights Protection

The GMS and neighboring countries comprise one of the world’s most dynamic migration hubs.^[102] With the economic benefits migrant workers bring to GMS, studies into the living and working conditions of low-skilled migrants in the region reveal indicators of abuse commonly associated with labor exploitation are widespread. These indicators include deception about wages, type of work, and legal status; withheld wages; retained passports or identity documents; physical confinement; substandard working conditions; and threats of denunciation to the authorities.^[103] The majority of workers are subject to the “3D” (Dirty, Dangerous and Demeaning) nature of the work and the low pay the workers receive.^[104] For example, in Thailand, fishery is one of the sectors that employs high numbers of migrant workers, especially for work on small- and middle-sized boats.^[105] This work is considered one of the hardest and most high-endurance jobs because it requires night shifts, short breaks, and outdoor work in the middle of the sea.^[106] Another common issue is the presence of irregular or undocumented migrants, those stigmatized and treated as criminals, disease carriers, a threat to the local workforce, and even as a threat to the national security and social order.^[107] In the warning situation of violating human rights, for the past decade, there has been no regional collaboration on this issue, and currently, the protection mechanism heavily relies on the International and ASEAN frameworks on human rights.

On an international scale, migrant workers, regardless of their status, are entitled to human rights, just like all members of the human family worldwide, shall enjoy the protection of international instruments, most importantly the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (Migrant Convention). Although the Migrant Convention does not explicitly mention climate change as a driving force of labor migration, climate-induced labor migrants still fall under its scope.^[108] However, GMS states has exhibited a reluctant attitude to join this Migrant Convention. It can be seen that up to the present, Cambodia is the only country in the region that has signed the Migrant Convention.^[109] The absence of GMS and ASEAN countries from these conventions weakens the protection of migrant workers, increasing their reliance on regional and national mechanisms.

On regional scales, ASEAN established the ASEAN Labor Ministers (ALM) Work Program to enhance human resource development. This program focuses on five key priorities: job creation, labor market monitoring, labor mobility, social protection, and tripartite cooperation^[110]. To further strengthen regional labor governance, ASEAN adopted ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the 2007 Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (DPPRMW).^[111] This declaration aims to improve the protection and promotion of migrant workers’ rights across ASEAN member states. However, as Petcharamesree^[112] noted, the preamble’s emphasis on state sovereignty in regulating migration policies – such as determining entry conditions and residence terms – has limited the agreement’s binding effect.

Contrary to ASEAN’s clear policy directions and cooperation towards labor migration, the labor migration framework in the GMS remains even more fragile, as it currently relies on only two main mechanisms: GMS-ECP, established by the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral agreements between Thailand and its neighboring countries in the GMS and ASEAN. In terms of GMS-ECP, one of the four stated objectives of that strategy is to help countries develop a better framework for the flow and development of human resources.^[113] In support of this objective, in June 2005, the World Bank launched its multi-year GMS Labor Migration Program. Notably, one of its key goals most relevant to climate change is to “raise awareness about these issues and their significance for poverty reduction at the highest levels of policymaking”.^[114] However, these remain merely policy initiatives and fall short of providing a legally binding regime that safeguards migrant workers’ rights and interests in a detailed and specific manner.

3. Challenges and Recommendations for GMS

The adaptive policy and legal framework is comprehensive despite the lack of collaboration from China and Myanmar, representing an immense potential for GMS to address climate change and labor migration in the pursuit of achieving regional sustainable development. However, this mechanism cannot be deemed entirely effective, particularly in a region characterized by unique geographical advantages and disadvantages, as well as rapid industrialization. This status emphasizes the challenges that GMS needs to confront in the case of employing labor migration as a policy strategy to adapt to climate change. The biggest challenge GMS has to face is the diplomatic matter related to the willingness of each member state for a common development goal. This is because when the right protection issues come to the surface, AMS and GMS tend to take the issue more under the framework of a threat to their national security, such as dam construction, and not so much considering it as human security (the interest and the needs of the workers) issues.^[115] This explains why, for a long time, migrant workers in ASEN have been left unprotected in an adverse situation.^[116]

Taking into account the emergency of GMS people’s livelihood due to climate change, several recommendations are suggested to promote a more effective policy and legal mechanism for adapting to climate change through labor migration. Firstly, integrating the climate migration, including labor migration, into national policies such as the National Adaptation Plan by focusing on the resilience capacity of the community, especially reinforcing the regulation related to reduce poverty-induced climate change and capacity building. Secondly, it holds significance for GMS states to ratify international commitment related to migrant workers, especially when the Migrant Convention has potentially great utility for “nearly all other migrants in vulnerable situations, notably those who are in irregular situations”.^[117] This group constitutes a significant portion of labor migrants in the GMS and is being left outside the protection of the law, contrary to the inalienability of human rights.^[118] Recognizing that many climate change-affected communities in the GMS are already utilizing traditional labor migration schemes as a means of adaptation, these rights-based recommendations will enhance existing protections for migrants and enable them to better leverage these policies to contribute to regional sustainable economic growth.

Conclusion

Climate change and labor migration are two closely interconnected issues. While labor migration serves as a strategy for local communities to adapt to the impacts of climate change, simultaneously, climate change also acts as a driving force behind economic migration. This practice is particularly true with the situation of GMS, where over the past decades, people have chosen to move abroad for better employment opportunities due to climate change and the environmental crisis. Currently, GMS has two mechanisms to adopt labor migration in climate change adaptation; firstly, the ASEAN Framework on climate change and labor migrants; secondly GMS Framework on Climate change. This framework has an immense opportunity for GMS to apply the policy of labor migration to the climate change adaptation mechanism. However, there are also multiple limitations and challenges that must be addressed for it to function effectively – issues that lie beyond the scope of this article for in-depth examination. Despite this limitation, it does not mean to diminish the potential of the initiative that both safeguards the rights of labor migrants and generates economic benefits in the broader effort to cope with climate change – a triple win. Now, what should be drawn attention on is how to build a comprehensive legal framework to protect the labor rights of migrant workers, especially providing a legal corridor for irregular migrants. This will be a difficult task necessitating robust cooperation among ASEAN member states and GMS states, with the involvement of China.

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Mekong Migration Network & Asian Migrant Centre. Climate Change and Migration: Exploring the Impacts of Climate Change on People’s Livelihoods and Migration in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (2013).

Sciortino, Rosalia et al. Labor Migration in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (2006).

Sembiring, Margareth. Examining Cooperation for Climate Change Adaptation in Southeast Asia: The Case of Lower Mekong River Basin (Singapore: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2018), online: JSTOR https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26806.

Smajgl, Alexander & John Ward, eds. The Water-Food-Energy Nexus in the Mekong Region: Assessing Development Strategies Considering Cross-Sectoral and Transboundary Impacts (New York: Springer, 2013).

Reports and Working Papers

Abeygunawardena, Piya et al. Poverty and Climate Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor Through Adaptation (Washington, DC: World Bank), online: https://documents.worldbank.org.

Asian Development Bank. Facilitating Safe Labor Migration in the Greater Mekong Subregion (Manila: ADB, 2013), online: https://www.adb.org.

Asian Development Bank. Greater Mekong Subregion Livelihood Support for Corridor Towns: Implementation Completion Memorandum (2020), online: https://www.adb.org.

Asian Development Bank. Risk Financing for Rural Climate Resilience in the Greater Mekong Subregion, Publication No TCS178804-2 (Manila: ADB, May 2017), DOI: 10.22617/TCS178804-2.

Asian Research Center for Migration. Mitigating Exploitative Situation of Migrant Workers (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 2008).

ILO Mekong Sub-Regional Project & UN Inter-Agency Project. Labour Migration and Trafficking Within the Greater Mekong Sub-Region: Proceedings of Mekong Sub-Regional Experts Meeting and Exploratory Policy Paper (Bangkok: ILO & UN-IAP, December 2001), online: https://www.ilo.org.

International Organization for Migration. Compendium of IOM Activities in Migration, Climate Change and the Environment (Geneva: IOM, 2009), online: https://publications.iom.int.

International Organization for Migration. International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration, 3rd ed (Geneva: IOM, 2019), online: https://publications.iom.int.

International Organization for Migration. Policy and Data Insights in the Lower Mekong Subregion: Acting on Human Mobility in a Changing Climate (Bangkok: IOM, 28 June 2024), online: https://roasiapacific.iom.int.

International Organization for Migration. Thailand Migration Report 2011 (Geneva: IOM, 2011), online: https://publications.iom.int.

Kraler, Albert, Caitlin Katsiaficas & Martin Wagner. Climate Change and Migration: Legal and Policy Challenges and Responses to Environmentally Induced Migration (Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, July 2020), online: https://www.europarl.europa.eu.

Mitchell, Tom & Katie Harris. Resilience: A Risk Management Approach, Background Note (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2012), online: https://www.odi.org.

Ospina Parada, Angelica Valeria & Kanta K Rigaud. Integrating Resilience Attributes into Operations: A Note for Practitioners, Working Paper No ACS29975 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2021), online: https://documents.worldbank.org.

Revenga, Ana et al. Labor Migration in the Greater Mekong Sub-region: Synthesis Report, Phase I (Washington, DC: World Bank, November 2006), online: https://data.opendevelopmentmekong.net.

Tunon, Max. Migrant Labour Protection Issues and Responses in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (Bangkok: ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific), online: https://mekonginstitute.org.

Vigil, Sofía et al. Climate Change, Migration and Justice: SEI’s Research and Pathways for Overcoming Challenges, SEI Report (Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute, 2025), DOI: 10.51414/sei2025.008.

World Bank. Introduction to Poverty Analysis (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005), online: https://documents.worldbank.org.

World Bank. Remittances Data Inflows (April 2012), online: https://www.worldbank.org.

World Health Organization. Health of Refugees and Migrants: Regional Situation Analysis, Practices, Experiences, Lessons Learned and Ways Forward (Manila: WHO Western Pacific Region, 2018), online: https://www.who.int.

Chapters and Journal Articles

Asis, RP & CL Maningat. “The ‘ASEAN Way’ in Migration Governance” in Heaven Crawley & Joseph Kofi Teye, eds, The Palgrave Handbook of South–South Migration and Inequality (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024), DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-39814-8_31.

Basir, Salawati Mat. “Irregular Migrations in Southeast Asia: Challenges for Protection and Migration” (2020) 17:2 Indonesian J Intl L art 1, DOI: 10.17304/ijil.vol17.2.782.

Bearden, Bennett L. “The Legal Regime of the Mekong River: A Look Back and Some Proposals for the Way Ahead” (2010) 12:6 Water Policy 798, DOI: 10.2166/wp.2009.060.

Béné, Christophe et al. “Resilience, Poverty and Development” (2014) 26:4 J Intl Dev 598, DOI: 10.1002/jid.2992.

Draper, J. “Labor Migration and Climate Change Adaptation” (2022) 116:3 Am Pol Sci Rev 1012, DOI: 10.1017/S0003055421001313.

Dustmann, Christian & Josep Mestres. “Remittances and Temporary Migration” (2010) 92:1 J Dev Econ 62, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.12.002.

Ericson, Jason P et al. “Effective Sea-Level Rise and Deltas: Causes of Change and Human Dimension Implications” (2006) 50:1–2 Global & Planetary Change 63, DOI: 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2005.07.004.

Felipe Pérez, Beatriz. “Beyond the Shortcomings of International Law: A Proposal for the Legal Protection of Climate Migrants” in Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent, eds, Climate Refugees: Beyond the Legal Impasse? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), DOI: 10.4324/9781315109619.

Khalid, Bilal & Mariusz Urbański. “Approaches to Understanding Migration: A Multi-Country Analysis of the Push and Pull Migration Trend” (2021) 14:4 Economics & Sociology 242.

Lenard, Patti Tamara & Christine Straehle. “Temporary Labour Migration, Global Redistribution, and Democratic Justice” (2011) 11:2 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 206.

Lonergan, S. “The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population Displacement” (Spring 1998) 4 Environmental Change & Security Project Report 5.

Massey, Douglas S et al. “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal” (1993) 19:3 Population & Development Rev 431.

Nguyen, Thi Phuoc Lai & Chanmony Sean. “Do Climate Uncertainties Trigger Farmers’ Out-Migration in the Lower Mekong Region?” (2021) 3 Current Research in Environmental Sustainability 100087, DOI: 10.1016/j.crsust.2021.100087.

Petcharamesree, S. “ASEAN and Its Approach to Forced Migration Issues” (2015) 20:2 Intl JHR 173, DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2015.1079021.

Sundrijo, Dwi Ardhanariswari & Dhanny Safitri. “Migrant Labour Protection in ASEAN: In What Way Does ILO Matter?” (2023) 25:2 Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional 95.

Ta Khanh Linh. “Protection for Climate Migration in Southeast Asia: Examining the Role of International Environmental Law” (19 December 2023), online: International Law Blog https://internationallaw.blog.

Taran, Patrick A & Heikki S Mattila. “Human Rights of Migrants: Challenges of the New Decade — Protection of Migrants’ Human Rights: Principles and Practice” in International Migration and Human Rights (Geneva: International Organization for Migration), online: https://publications.iom.int.

Wang, L. “Towards Better Cooperation: Legal Analysis on Coping with Climate Change in the Mekong River Basin” (2025) 2:1 Intl J Educ & Soc Dev 20, DOI: 10.54097/mr3gjm30.

Online Sources

Asian Development Bank. About Greater Mekong Subregion, online: https://greatermekong.org.

Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. “What Is the Difference Between Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience?”, online: https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute.

Greater Mekong Subregion. About the Greater Mekong Subregion, online: https://greatermekong.org.

Greater Mekong Subregion. Overview: Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program, online: https://www.greatermekong.org.

International Labour Organization. “ILO: Labour Migration Should Be a Safe Choice”, online: https://www.ilo.org.

International Labour Organization. How to Facilitate the Recognition of Skills of Migrant Workers (2020), online: https://www.ilo.org.

International Organization for Migration. Environmental Migration, online: https://environmentalmigration.iom.int.

International Organization for Migration. Labour Migration and Climate Change: Information Sheet (2024), online: https://www.iom.int.

International Organization for Migration. Types of Labour Migration, online: https://emm.iom.int.

Mekong River Commission. Climate Change, online: https://www.mrcmekong.org.

Mekong River Commission. Geographic Regions, online: https://www.mrcmekong.org.

Mekong River Commission. Mekong River Basin, online: https://www.mrcmekong.org.

Needham, Kirsty. “World Bank President in Tuvalu Says Youth Skills Key to Climate Change Plan” (6 September 2024), online: Reuters https://www.reuters.com.

UNICEF. Sudden Onsets and Climate-Induced Migration, online: https://www.unicef.org.

Zorya, Sergiy. “Five Facts About Rice and Poverty in the Greater Mekong Sub-region” (9 March 2025), online: World Bank Blogs https://blogs.worldbank.org.

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